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ABSTRACT 
In this thesis, I shall argue that the labels of "laissez-faire model"， 
"developmental statism" and "positive non-interventionism" are all 
inappropriate to describe the actual role of the colonial government in the 
process of economic restructuring of Hong Kong — from an entrepot to a 
labour-intensive and export-oriented industrial city. Evidences showed that the 
selective interventionist approach of the government was hinged on its prime 
concern on the interests of Britain and British hongs. The colonial government 
had maintained an institutional framework which favoured the economic 
activities in general, and favoured the commercial/financial sector in particular. 
The government co-operated with the British expatiate conglomerates in 
improving the local infrastructure, public utilities, banking and financial 
system, as well as the international trade networking. Many local Chinese 
industrialists also relied on the resources of the hongs and formed a kind of 
"strategic symbiotic relations" with them. 
The hongs tried great efforts in keeping an intimate capital-state linkage. 
Representatives of the hongs had the rights to vote in the Legislative and 
Executive Councils. They could get first-hand information about the 
government's plans/policies in advance. And they easily earned the monopolies 
of businesses in various fields in Hong Kong. Hence, the selective 
interventionist role of the HK government in the economy was related with the 
colonial regime on the one hand, and the strategic relations among the 
government, the British hongs and the local Chinese industrialists on the other 
hand. , 
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1.1. THE MAIN THEME 
The marvelous story of the economic restructuring (from mainly entrepot trade to 
labour-intensive, export-oriented manufacturing) of Hong Kong have been told many 
times. In the relevant literature, the role of Hong Kong government was often interpreted as 
marginal in the process of the economic development. The cases of other Asian newly 
industrialising countries (NICs), such as Singapore, Taiwan and South Korea, were usually 
taken as a contrast with the so-called "Hong Kong's laissez-faire model". These Asian states 
took an extensive interventionist approach (also coined as developmental statism) in 
upgrading the local economy. To mention a few of their strategies — they encouraged or 
directed companies into higher value-added, and more technology-intensive forms of 
production; they legislated to discourage short-term speculative domestic investment, and 
thus ensured private capital flowing into manufacturing; they created industrial sectors which 
did not exist previously either through state companies or through the supply of credit and 
financial guarantees to private companies; they invested heavily in the creation and 
refinement of new technologies, usually by setting- <up government R&D facilities and 
y 
funding; they protected domestic markets, either across the board or with regard to particular 
products; they sometimes used price controls to discourage domestic market exploitation in 
conditions of near-monopolistic supply, they controlled the exchange rate of currency; they 
promoted the services sectors (especially those with high potential) ...etc. *l 
1 Chu, Y.H., 1989, "State Structure and Economic Adjustment of the East Asian Newly 
Industrializing Countries", International Organization, 43, 4，Autumn, pp.647-672. 
Henderson, J.，& Appelbaum，R.，- 1992，"Situating the State in the East Asian 
Development Process", in States and Development in the Asian Pacific Rim, eds., by 
Henderson, et.al.，Sage Publications, Inc. 
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Hence, under developmental statism, across the 1950s to 70s, the three Asian Tigers 
experienced industrial deepening, but Hong Kong's industrial structure lagged behind. Many 
scholars acknowledged that the failure of HK to upgrade its industries can be attributed to the 
under-intervention of the government. *2 Signals for the need of industrial upgrading such 
as labour shortage, low labour quality, protectionism in foreign markets, severe competition 
with Asian neighbours, inadequacy of industrial land, ...etc. had been flashed for so many 
years since the end of the 1950s. But why did the industrial structure of HK stubbornly 
entrench in the labour-intensive stage ？ Why did the government ignore all these economic 
signals ？ Why did the government not launch large-scale interventions to manufacturers ？ 
On the other hand, did the government really take the laissez-faire attitude to all economic 
sectors ？ Or rather it took a selective interventionist role ？ 
In sum, my main interest is not on the classification of the state itself，but on the political 
explanation about why did the colonial state take a particular orientation of interventions 
in the economy. 
Before I answer the questions, I have to explain several key terms (see figure 1.1). 
Firstly，the "laissez-faire approach on economic policy" refers to the belief that a 
• ( 
government has to foster economic activities and to l^ ve legitimate business to operate at a 
profit. It is assumed that entrepreneurs in an open market economy know best what and how 
to produce and so their business should be allowed to thrive without interference. The 
primary role of the government is the provision of the necessary infrastructure and a stable 
legal and administrative framework, law and order, which is conductive to growth and 
Chen，Edward, K.Y., 1989，"Export-led Economic Development in Chinese Societies: 
the Existence of Transferability of the NIC Model," in Y.C. Yao, Victor Mok and Lok-Sang 
Ho，(eds), Economic Development in Chinese Societies, HK: Hong Kong U. Press. 
Choi，Alex, 1994’ "Beyond Market and State: A Study of Hong Kong's Industrial 
Transformation," Studies in Political Economy, 45: 28-64. 
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development. It is believed that the economy operates with the assistance of an automatic 
corrective mechanism, or called "the invisible hand" *3，along with the recognition of the 
public policy implications of the conditions of an open economy. *4 
Another key term, the ”positive non-interventionism" coined by the former Financial 
Secretary, Philip Haddon-Cave, refers to the economic philosophy or view that it is damaging 
to the growth of an economy for a government to attempt to plan the allocation of resources 
available to the private sector and to frustrate the operation of markets forces. The main 
functions of government are to maintain, over time, a coherent set of neutral economic, fiscal 
and budgetary policies so that the predominance of the private market sector and the 
flexibility of the cost-price structure are both maintained. Government intervention is 
required where imperfections in markets lead to the emergence of monopoly situations. 
Where markets have grown up too fast for convention to take a grip, or where they need to be 
monitored in the general public interest, a framework of constraints and ground rules may 
have to be enshrined in the law. Yet, intervention may be justified in situations where the 
unrestrained pursuit of individual interests have undersirable macro-economic consequences, 
although care must be taken to define those situations and to measure the consequences of 
intervention. In addition, the term "positive” is important: when facing with an interventionist 
proposal, decisions are made positively, and not by default, and only after the immediate 
benefits and costs, to the extent that they can be predicted, are weighed against the medium 
and longer term implications of the interventionist acts proposed. Usually the government 
It is assumed that, in the absence of artificial restrictions on the free movement of 
goods and services, continuously alters internal costs and prices to bring them quickly into 
line with costs and prices in the rest of the world and hence keeps the economy oscillating 
around a growth path with internal and external balances. See, Hall, Robert, & Taylor, 
John, 1993, Macroeconomics, 4th. ed.，New York: Norton & Co.，chap.one. 
Ho, Yin-Ping, 1992, Trade，Industrial Restructuring，and Development in Hong 
Kong, London: MacMillan press. 194-202. 
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comes to the conclusion that the balance of advantages lies in not intervening after a process 
of careful calculation. *5 
After explaining the key terms, I should argue that the term "laissez-faire" is not 
appropriate to describe the nature/role of the HK government in the economy in 1950 to 
70. It did not care too much the interests of local manufacturers, but this did not imply that 
the government followed laissez-faire in all economic dimensions. Actually the government 
took a clear and strong position (as I will coin as selective interventionism) in protecting 
and promoting the business interests (and the relevant fields) of the British hongs. At the 
same time the hongs consolidated their domination in HK through exercising their influences 
in the Legislative and Executive Councils on the one hand, and through diversifying their 
businesses across different fields in Hong Kong (both vertically and horizontally). The 
colonial government did not invest too much in the small city since it simply understood that 
Hong Kong was "a borrowed place in a borrowed time". London would not encourage the 
colonial government to spend too much revenue in equipping the small colony with unclear 
fUture (hence industrial upgrading was obviously not in the top priority of agenda of the 
government). Under this limitation, the colonial government would like to see the vigorous 
•广 
investments of the British hongs in HK since they shared the cost of building up Hong 
Kon8 (such as in infrastructure and public utilities). The government was happy to grant the 
monopolies / franchise to the British hongs in many large projects. The top agenda of the 
colonial government was to maintain law and order，and to provide a good business 
environment for the British hongs mainly. Under these strategic considerations, both the 
state elite and the hongs realised their shared interests. 
' Haddon-Cave, Philip, 1982, "Public Policy and Economic Success", Hong Kong 
Manager, (vol. xviii, May): 15-19. 
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Except in some critical issues that conflicted with their own interests (such as 
industrial land sale, and the setting up of a public-owned industrial bank), the hongs were 
more or less in good working relations with the Chinese manufacturers (since the hongs 
provided loans, marketing, shipping, insurance, technology and many other services to the 
manufacturers). Furthermore, there was internal division among the Chinese industrial 
bourgeoisie. It was difficult for them to mobilize resolutely to resist the colonial domination 
structure. In addition, most of the industrialists were easily satisfied in the colonial regime 
which provided cheap labour, law and order, and shelter from the communist threat. 
The fact that the British hongs / conglomerates dominated in many business sectors in 
Hong Kong is a sound evidence showing that the rhetoric tool of the government, positive 
non-interventionism, did not match with the real situation of Hong Kong. Since positive 
non-interventionism assumes that (i) the policy orientation of the government is neutral, and 
preventing the monopoly situations; (ii) the government has long-term planning / horizon. 
However, the actual case of Hong Kong did not fulfill all these. Therefore, I would like to 
maintain that positive non-interventionism was just a vague rhetoric tool to cover the 
discriminative policies of the colonial government. The colonial government provided a lot of 
business opportunities for the British conglomerates on the one hand, and the government 
ignored many requests from the Chinese manufacturers on the other hand. Lacking cheap 
industrial land and industrial bank (for examples), the manufacturers obtained few 
encouragement from the government to upgrade towards capital-intensive working stage. In 
sum，the colonial nature of the Hong Kong government is a key factor to explain its selective 
interventionist role in the economic restructuring of the city-state. 
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1.2. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
1.2.1. THE PROPER ROLE OF THE STATE IN ECONOMY 
The theme of this thesis starts from the idea of the proper role of the state in economy. 
Now as a common understanding, most states are for both plenty and power.*6 They all 
work for the accumulation of wealth and for the strengthening of their power base. Douglass 
North argues that the creation of a state is an essential precondition for economic growth. One 
of the most central functions of the state is defining, in the last instance, the property rights 
that will prevail in the economy and which are central for shaping the incentives to which the 
agents of the economy will respond. In other words, the fundamental economic task of the 
state is to establish and give credibility and legitimacy to laws, rules and other institutional 
arrangements which make human exchange possible, that is, to guarantee property rights and 
to protect the validity of contracts. *7 
Besides the fundamental task, most of the states nowadays have taken active 
economic adjustment policies. Economic adjustment can be defined as a nation's response to 
changes in the comparative costs of production, the demands and conditions in the world 
market，the patterns of the international flow of money and credit, and the foreign economic 
policies adopted by other nations. *8 National adjustment strategies adapt a nation's 
production and financial and trade structure to the prevailing external structural and resource 
° Viners J., 1948，"Power versus Plenty as Objectives of Foreign Policy in the 17th and 
18th Centuries", World Politics, vol. 1. 
North，D.，1979，"A Framework for Analyzing the State in Economic History", 
Exploration in Economic History. Vol.16. 
Chu’ Y.H., 1989，"State Structure and Economic Adjustment of the East Asian Newly 
Industrializing Countries", International Organization. 43，4，Autumn, pp.647-672. 
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constraints so that an equilibrium, between different domestic interest groups on the one 
hand, and between national and world political economy on the other hand, can be achieved. 
Under increasing pressure for industrial restructuring and export upgrading, private 
companies also make adjustments, sometimes in the absence of state policy. If left 
unchecked, many of the adjustments of private companies (such as layoffs, deinvestments, 
rent-seeking, capital flight) can have negative effects to the national political economy. 
Moreover, in the absence of state actions, the private sector may take a longer period (and 
waste more resources) to adjust itself. *9 Under either condition，the state may feel 
responsible to intervene. But, if a state chooses not to intervene, its strategic absence calls for 
an explanation. 
An analysis of the economic adjustment policies of Hong Kong, Singapore, South 
Korea and Taiwan (the Four Little Tigers) shows that these East Asian newly industrializing 
countries (NICs), which faced common problems in sustaining their economic growth, 
responded to the challenge with different adjustment strategies and differed in degree of 
intensity of state involvement. HK has taken a divergent route in contrast with other three 
Asian NICs. 
j 
1.2.2. CONCEPTION OF THE DEVELOPMENTAL STATE 
The state is usually taken as a key actor (with the developmental role) in explaining 
the rapid economic growth of the East Asian countries in post-war era. Gunnarson and 
Lundahl *10 define a developmental state as a state that takes on the task of accumulating the 
9 Chu, Y.H., 1989. 
10 Gunnarson and Lundahl, 1996，"The Good, the Bad and the Wobbly: State Forms and 
Third World Economic Performance", in New Directions in Development Economirs 
CODE-1MPHIL.SAM 
P-8 
wealth and power of its entire nation (as national entities rather than to persons). The 
developmental state is never just a passive follower of the market. To some extent, it always 
interferes with the play of market forces and attempts to correct for what is taken to be market 
failure. 
Appelbaum and Henderson summarised the forms of intervention by the East Asian 
developmental states (such as Japan, South Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan, but not including 
HK): *n 
(i) They have encouraged or directed companies into higher value-added, and more 
technology-intensive forms of production. 
&) They have legislated to discourage short-term speculative domestic or overseas 
investment, and thus indirectly have ensured private capital flow into manufacturing. 
(iii) They have created industrial sectors that did not previously exist either through state 
companies or through the supply of credit and financial guarantees to private companies. 
(iv) They have invested heavily in the creation and refinement of new technologies, usually 
by setting up government R&D facilities and funding. 
(v) They have protected domestic markets, either across the board or with regard to particular 
• ( 
products. i 
(vi) They have consistently monitored world markets in search of export opportunities, and in 
order to identify new types of demand that they may then encourage companies to meet. 
(vii)顶巧 have sometimes used price controls to discourage domestic market exploitation in 
conditions of near-monopolistic supply. 
eds. by Lundahl M., and Ndulu, B., Routledge. 
11 Henderson, J.，& Appelbaum，R.，1992, "Situating the State in the East Asian 
Development Process", in States and Development in the Asian Pacific Rim, eds., by 
Henderson, et.al.，Sage Publications, Inc. See also, Amsden, 1979; Cumming, 1987; 
Gold, 1979; Skocpol, 1985; Castells, 1992; Henderson, J., 1992; Harris, N., 1992. 
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(viii) They have subjected companies receiving state-guaranteed credits to rigorous 
performance standards. 
However, in the empirical experiences of developing countries, the interventions 
(from developmentalism) do not work everywhere. Gunnarson and Lundahl maintain that 
market regulations with respect to imports, agricultural prices, foreign exchange, etc. helped 
to turn Taiwan into an industrial market economy while such interventions have hampered 
the development of market economies in Africa. 
Amsden argues that in the poorest countries, incomes are too low to allow technology 
gaps to be closed by means of state interventions.*12 Uneven distribution of income (and 
resources) tends to undermine the relative autonomy of the state, since influential groups then 
have the power to manipulate the state in their own interest. In too many Third World 
Countries, incomes are not only very low but also unevenly distributed. This is a problem in 
itself since it tends to obstruct development. A market economy requires, to certain extent, an 
equality of opportunity. In order to create that, some form of redistribution of assets is usually 
needed. In East Asia, income distribution was made relatively equal, mainly as a result of the 
• ( 
implementation of comprehensive land reform and socfel welfare policy. In the cases of Hong 
Kong and Singapore, there are large scale of public housing programs (which have served to 
subsidize wages and legitimate the centralised and autocratic states). All four Little Tigers put 
much resources on education, medical services, infrastructure and other public utilities. In 
other words, economic development requires a process of nation building (or consolidation 
Amsden, A. H.，1992, “ A Theory of Government Intervention in Late 
Industrialization', in State and Market in Development. Synergy or Rivalry? eds. by 
Rueschmeyer, D.，et.al., Lynne Rienner, Boulder, CO and London. ， 
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of legitimacy in the case of colonial HK). A successful developmental strategy, in most 
occasions, should be accompanied with policy for equality. 
1.2.3. POLITICS OF DEFINING THE ROLE OF THE STATE 
The extent and ways of state interventions in Hong Kong are quite different from 
those of the other three Little Tigers. The HK government played an active interventionist 
role in several aspects *13 such as --
--adopting a particular monetary policy (i.e. putting a large portion of non-fixed assets of HK 
in London, and controlling the exchange rate of HK dollar), 
-massive provision of public housing for low-income households, 
promoting international trade, 
-urban md infrastructure development (i.e. land reclamation, developing satellite towns and 
industrial areas, de facto land nationalization), 
-controlling the prices of foodstuffs, etc. 
Since the orientation and substance of interventions of HK is so different from other 
NICs，we cannot classify HK as a developmental state. *14 Nevertheless, my interest is not 
on the classification itself, but on Apolitical explanation about why does the colonial state 
13 Schiffer, J.R., 1991，"State Policy and Economic Growth: A Note on the Hong Kong 
Model’'，International Journal of Urban and Regional Research. 15, no.2. 
14 1x1 order t0 gap, some scholars (such as Deyo, 1992; Jao，Y.C., 1974; Wong 
G.，1991; Lui, T.L. & Chiu，S.，1996; Redding, G. 1993; Wong, S.L. 1988，1986, 1985;' 
Wong，W.P. & Lui, T.L. 1994) attempt to stress the role of non-governmental institutions, 
both formal and informal (such as banking and other services corporations, business 
networking, Chinese entrepreneurship). These institutions are understood as taking up the 
role (or partial role) of government in promoting the economic growth of Hong Kong. 
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take that particular orientation of interventions in the economy. For expanding the picture, 
Stephen Chiu (1992, 1994，1995, 1996) and other scholars (Ho, K.C. & Lui，T.L. 1995; Chiu, 
S. & Lui，T丄.1996; Chu, Y.W., 1988) try to explain Hong Kong's exceptionalism 
(laissez-faire orientation of the colonial state) by deciphering the political origin - that is, the 
alliance between the colonial state elite and the leading British commercial and financial 
bourgeoisie worked to defeat the proposals (in 1950s) for state allocation of more resources 
(such as industrial land at preferential terms, industrial bank credits, technological supports to 
particular industries, government's loan/subsidies or tax holidays) to the Chinese 
manufacturers in HK. *15 
Chiu argues that the colonial state's financial stringency put the limitation on its 
ability to mobilize resources to subsidize industrial development in the 1950s. At the same 
time，the British bankers resisted the introduction of a publicly-owned industrial bank, 
because it would compete against them for business. Furthermore, Chiu points out that the 
British commercial and financial bourgeoisie inside the governing coalition blocked the 
Chinese industrialists' demands for the sale of industrial land at concessionary terms, partly 
because they worried about the possibility of tax increases to pay for such subventions. 
However, Chiu has no detailed discussion about the "relative autonomy" of the HK 
state in his analysis. In this thesis, I shall argue that the relative autonomy of the state should 
be counted and analysed under the historical/ empirical context. The relative autonomy is an 
important conceptual tool to explain the complexity of the HK story. 
！5 Chiu，s.，1996，"Unravelling Hong Kong's Exceptionalism : Politics of Laissez-Faire 
m the Industrial Takeoff', Political Power and Social Theory, vol 10 JAI Press Inc 
pp.229-256. ‘ “ 
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1.2.4. THE RELATIVE AUTONOMY OF THE STATE 
For many Marxists, the fundamental role of the state in capitalist society is to express 
and further the domination of the capitalist class over society as a whole (more specifically, 
the various forms of the capitalist state express and further the domination of the fractions of 
the capitalist class that make up the power bloc under the hegemony of one of them). *16 
However, Poulantzas conceptualises the capitalist state as having a relative autonomy from 
the "economic". He argues that the institutions of state power present a specific internal 
cohesion (such as the autonomized juridico-political superstructure). The relative autonomy 
Poulantzas refers as the state's relation to the field of class struggle, in particular its relative 
autonomy vis-a-vis the classes and fractions of the power bloc. *17 He reminds us to avoid 
the danger of "hyperfunctionalist" explanation, from which, everything the state managers do 
must be conceived as functional to the dominant interests. 
For Poulantzas, in order to maintain its relative autonomy, 
"the capitalist state presents itself as the strictly political and 
public unity of the people-nation, composed of agents set up as 
subjects, as individuals/political persons. It constitutes the 
secret of this national-popular-class-state： the institutionalized 
power of the capitalist class state presents its own class unity, 
precisely in so far as it can pose as a national-popular state, i.e., 
as a state which does not represents the power of one or several 
determinate classes, ... given over to economic antagonisms 
which the state claims to have the function of surmounting by 
unifying these agents within a popular-national body. This 
characteristic of the capitalist state is related to a precise 
ideological function: given the specific efficacity of the 
ideological and its role in the framework of the capitalist, it 
would be wrong to underestimate the importance of this 
Fortin，C. & Anglade，C.，1985，"Conceptual and Historical Introduction", The State 
and Capital Accumulation in Latin America eds. by Fortin, C. & Anglade，C., University 
of Pittsburgh Press. 




fUnction，which in fact concerns the complex problem of the 
legitimacy of this state. ... In short, the state as representative 
of the political unity of the nation-people, is nevertheless 
reflected in a whole real institutional framework which tends to 
function effectively according to the concrete situation of the 
forces present, in the direction of a specific unity of the state's 
power and of a relative autonomy vis-a-vis the dominant 
classes. ... In effect, this state is supposed to represent the 
general interest, the general will and the political unity of the 
people and the nation." *18 
In empirical occasions, the particular interests of the various fractions of the dominant 
class are not only different but are sometimes in conflict. The state therefore needs to have 
some autonomy from any of the fractions of the dominant class to be able to express the 
interests of the dominant class as a whole. The relative autonomy of the state can function as 
maintaining the balance between political legitimacy and capital accumulation in the 
capitalist society. 
Poulantzas rejects all forms of instrumentalism and insists that the state is a complex 
social relation. In particular, classes should not be seen as simple economic forces existing 
outside and independent of the state. Classes are not capable of manipulating the state as a 
passive tool. For the political influence of class depends partially on the concurrent 
institutional setting of the state and the effects of the st^ te power. Moreover, class struggle is 
J 
not cramped within the civil society, but is reproduced and reflected in the orientation of 
government policies. Furthermore, the state has an objective function to perform in 
maintaining social cohesion so that capital accumulation can proceed smoothly. *19 
Following the idea of Poulantzas, Jessop elaborates that, firstly, the state apparatus 
can be understood as a strategically selective terrain which has asymmetrical effects on the 
18 Poulantzas, N., 1978，pp.276-277. 
19 Jess°P' B.，1990，State Theory : Putting Capitalist States in Th^ ir Pi.^ Polity 
Press, pp.29-31. y 
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organization of power. In other words, the government policies, taxation and legislature 
should not be taken as "fair" to all social classes. Secondly, within these strategically 
selective limits of the state apparatus, the actual outcome of state power depends on the 
changing balance of forces engaged in political action both within and beyond the state. For 
a better understanding of the conception of state, Jessop suggests that we should focus more 
on --
(i) the distinctive institutional logics of different state forms and specific modes of 
policy-making (for example, the power of the colonial governor, Executive Council and 
Legislative Council had been defined/prescribed by the colonial constitution, i.e. the Royal 
Instructions, Letters Patten, and the constitution limited the form of political system in HK as 
only non-democratic); 
(¾ the changing balance of forces which is condensed in and through the distinct structures 
and functions of the state (for instance, the British hongs and later the Chinese merchants 
struggled for dominance, and their representatives were hunger for the seats in Legislative 
and Executive Councils); 
(iii) the links among state projects, accumulation strategies, and hegemonic projects (for 
• ( 
illustration, the British hongs, those had been the major sources of government revenue, 
received particular privilege on gaining the monopolies of public utilities businesses). 
Summing up the three points above, they analyse the dialectics between state-form 
determination and the balance of forces, and thus explore the ties between state and society. 
*20 
In a more operational level, the relative autonomy of the state usually depends upon 
the capacity of the state (e.g. financial, organizational, strategic, etc.). It also relates to the 
20 Jessop, B.，1990, p.303. — 
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power distribution of interest groups in the civil society (e.g. a relative pluralist pattern of 
power distribution among several interest groups can allow a higher degree of relative 
autonomy of the state). *21 The relative autonomy (and capacity of the state) may have 
different degree in different dimensions / policy sectors. For instance, on the one hand the 
state may be highly interventionist in housing and land policy, on the other hand it may be 
hands-off in services sector. 
1.2.5. THE ISH MODEL 
In the top power arena, there are ongoing struggles among state elite and the most 
dominant interest groups. The orientation of key policies (e.g. economic policy) reflects the 
’’sum of vectors" of influences of the dominant agents at the particular period of time. The 
present state-form and approved policies constraint the strategies of all interest groups. 
However, the relationship between the rational powerful agents and the state is dialectical. 
This relationship is also subject to historical contingencies (such as changes of the regional 
and/or world political economy). 
The relative autonomy of the state is intimately related to the broader institutional 
• ( 
setting. The state managers cannot enhance the state capacity (financial and organzational) 
without considering prevailing institutional constriants and power relations among dominant 
interest groups in the society. However, the state managers usually (but not always) situate in 
a better position since they may have the pre-given superior role in interpretation and 
resolution of conflicts (real or potential) among different interest groups. We cannot explain 
the relative autonomy without understanding the institutional dynamics. 
‘ Amsden, A. H.，1992，" A Theory of Government Intervention in Late 
Industrialization', in State and Market in Development Svnergv or Rivalry?, eds. by 
Rueschmeyer, D., et.al.，Lynne Rienner, Boulder, CO and London. —^ 
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In order to delineate the configuration of relative autonomy of the state, and the 
politics of economic policy, I introduce the Institutions - Strategic actions of agents -
Historical contingencies, or in short, ISH model 
This model is an integrated articulation of ideas from Kuan *22，Jessop *23，North *24， 
Thelen & Steinmo *25. 
Firstly, let us have the brief definitions of key terms. 
INSTITUTIONS ~ they are the rules of the game (with normative and regulative 
elements) in a society, or more formally, are the structural and organizational "space" and/or 
constraints devised by people. Institutions also exist in informal way (such as the traditions, 
dominant culture, social norms, common practices and codes of conducts). Institutions shape 
the ways of human interactions because institutions provide the incentives and/or 
disincentives in human exchange behaviours (whether in political, economic or social 
dimensions). Institutions reduce uncertainty by providing a structure to everyday life. Usually 
current institutions are respected by majority and backed by sanctions (i.e.，disincentives 
regulated by formal institutions). Institutions define and limit the set of choices of agents. 
• t 
Institutions also define the relationship between agents. The prevailing institutions are the 
outcome of past political struggles of agents. Institutional change shapes the way societies 
evolve through time. 
22 Kuan，Hsin-Chi, 1993 Nov., Quest for a Political Order in Hong Professorial 
l^augural Lecture.Series 19，Chinese University Bulletin, Supplement 31.— 
Jessop, B.，1990, State Theory : Puttin? Capitalist States in Their Place. Polity 
Press. ‘ 
North, D.，1990，Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance 
Cambridge U. Press. ——— — — — —— 
25 Thelen，K.，& Steinmo，S.，1992，"Historical Institutionalism in Comparative 
Pohtics"，in Structuring Politics : Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Analysk 
eds. by Steinmo, S•’ Thelen, K.，& Longstreth，F., Cambridge University Press. ， 
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STRATEGIC ACTIONS OF AGENTS - they are the dialectical political interactions 
between agents (each formulate rational strategy to maximize self-interests). Agents may 
form and re-form their power alliance (with other agents). These political struggles are 
mediated by the existing institutional setting. However, new powerful agents may pursue new 
goals through prevailing institutions. 
HISTORICAL CONTINGENCIES - They come from several sources - such as the 
unintended outcomes of government policies, and changes in the external environment. 
Contingencies may bring "push" and/or "pull" effects on the political and/or economic 
restructuring. Contingencies may lead to incremental change or sudden break-down of the 
existing institutions. Contingencies may also create chances for the subordinate agent(s) 
taking a turn of fortune (i.e. change in power positions). 
The ISH model tries to go beyond the theoretical debate on relative autonomy. It takes 
the relative autonomy of the state as an empirical question. It provides us a closer look on the 
dynamism of interactions between institutions and agents. And this dynamism determines the 






INSTITIJTTO]V<； -- ^w 
Formal and informal institutions structure 
and define the interests and relationship 
between agents. Usually, existing 
institutions are respected by the majority 
and backed by sanctions. Institutions can 
reduce uncertainty during human 
interactions. Institutions can shape and 
constrain political strategies. However, 
prevailing institutions are the outcome(s) 
of past political struggles of agents . 
"STRATEGIC ACTIONS OF AGENTS -?V f HISTORICAL CONTINGENCIES ) 
Dynamic and dialectical political They come from several sources - such as 
interactions between agents (each formulate ^e unintended outcomes of government 
rational strategy to maximize self-interests). policies, and changes in the external 
Agents may form and reform their power environment. Contingencies may bring 
alliance (with other agents). These political "push" and/or "pull" effects on the political 
struggles are mediated by the existing and/or economic restructuring, 
institutional setting. However, new Contingencies may lead to incremental 
powerful agents may pursue new goals change or sudden break-down of the 
through prevailing institutions. existing institutions. Contingencies may also 
create chances for the subordinate agent(s) 
taking a turn of fortune (i.e. change in 




1丄6. THE ISH MODEL AND THE ECONOMIC DYNAMICS IN 
HONG KONG ^  
(i) THE HISTORICAL CONTINGENCY, INTERNATIONAL HURRICANE AND 
THE MANUFACTURING BOOM -
In Chapter Two, I will introduce the argument that the beginning of the manufacturing boom 
of the small colony was triggered by several contingent factors (such as the Korean War, the 
UN embargo, the injection of capital, know-how and enterprise from Shanghai) after World 
War II. Before the 1950s, Hong Kong was a small entrepot which facilitated the British trade 
with China. The Communist victory on mainland China resulted in a huge flow of capital and 
entrepreneurs from China to Hong Kong. Together with them were a large pool of skilled and 
unskilled labour as refugees flooded into the small colony. Moreover, the Korean War 
syndrome disturbed the entrepot trade. All these contingent events came together and 
incubated a good condition for the economic restructuring of Hong Kong (from the 
entrepot-trade-oriented towards the labour-intensive manufacturing and export-oriented 
economy). In addition, at "a deeper level", the stable political environment in Hong Kong 
(which was a must for its prosperity) in the post-war era was constituted by the strategic 
• c 
equilibrium between China and Britain. j； 
(ii) THE STRATEGIC INTERACTIONS OF THE DOMINANT PLAYERS 一 
In Chapter Three, I will discuss the interactions among the dominant agents who orchestrated 
the economic development of the colony. In the case of Hong Kong，the state-commerce 
alliance is not a static and/or secure relationship. The industrialists had a weaker power 
relations with the colonial state at a certain period of time. However, they formulated 
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strategies under the prevailing institutional constriants (and waited for the favourable 
historical contingent conditions) for striving/strengthening their power relations with the state 
and other powerful interest groups. During the 1950s - 60s, the industrialists paid great 
contribution on the economic growth of HK. A high percentage of working population was 
employed in the manufacturing sector. A relative high employment rate was one of the 
important elements in maintaining the political stability of HK. The colonial government had 
strong resistence to industrial requests for support. However, it did not imply that the 
government had done nothing in facilitating the economic restructuring. Actually, it 
co-operated with the British hongs in improving the local infrastructure, public utilities, 
banking and financial system, as well as the international trade networking. Furthermore, 
most of the Chinese industrialists (aspecially the giant ones) built up a kind of "strategic 
symbiotic relations" with the hongs in business. That explained why the industrialists did not 
invoke any "revolutionary" action against the colonial government. 
There is no pre-given unity of different institutional means (formal and informal) of 
the capitalist state *，Even if the economic policy of the HK government has been 
intentionally designed for favouring the interests of commercial/financial capital (provided 
that we accept the proposition of Stephen Chiu), it does not follow that all governmental 
institutions (both formal and informal) should be understood as only advantageous to the 
commercial/financial sector exclusively. Some governmental institutional devices (intended 
for promoting the interests of commercial/financial capital and British hongs) may have 
unintended positive effects for the industrialists. 
26 Jessop, 1990. 
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(iii) THE INSTITUTIONS AND ECONOMIC GOVERNANCE -
In Chapter Four, I will analyse the role of the Hong Kong government and its selective 
interventions in the economy. It is important to be aware that the colonial government was 
not taking a neutral or laissez-faire perspective on economic governance. Evidences showed 
that, due to its colonial nature, the government had bias in favour of the interests of Britain 
and British hongs. These bias partly came from the colony's political system, and partly came 
from the colonial mind-sets of the top decision-makers in the bureaucracy. I prefer to take 
the formal legal structure and organizations, informal rules and norms, common practices, 
codes of conduct, .etc. all being included in the category of institution. Hence, the particular 
colonial mode of institutions induce the selective economic interventions of the city-state. 
Nevertheless, the particular mode of institutions was not static. It would be reinforced or 
modified by the dominant agents in different circumstances. 
Chapter Five will further elaborate the thesis that it delineates the historical 
foundation and dominance of the British hongs. Their giant enterprises and influences had 
significant impacts on the government policy-making on the one hand, and their business 
success were partly due to the favouritism of the colonial state on the other hand. Land is a 
• ( 
rare resource in Hong Kong and the hongs owned the best locations in the Hong Kong Island 
(such as the prime areas in the Central and Causeway Bay). The directors of the British 
hongs took the insiders' position in the Legislative and Executive Councils (as the top of th 
power structure, and just below the colonial governor). They got the first-hand information 
about the government's plans/policies in advance. They could easily defend their interests in 
the top decision-making process. And evidences showed that their scope of businesses (such 
as in banking, trading, land properties, transportation,..etc) had been received more positive 
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interventions from the colonial government (comparing with those for the manufacturing 
sector) and it will be discussed with a table in Chapter Four. 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 一 
In the economic restructuring process of Hong Kong during the 1950s and 60s, the 
government had taken a particular orientation of interventions in the economy (or mode of 
economic governance). The main theme of this thesis is to provide a political explanation on 
this. The explanation will involve (i) taking a clear picture on the particular 
empirical/historical context in order to let us have a fully consideration on the contingencies, 
(iO delineating the strategic relations (under a particular institutional framework) among 






HISTORICAL BACKGROUND，CONTINGENCY AND 
INTERNATIONAL HURRICANE — FROM THE MID OF 
1940s TO THE MID OF 1950s 
2.1. INTRODUCTION 
My theme of this chapter is to contextualise the colony's economic path and domestic 
economic policy orientation in a broader framework of strategic relationships between China 
and UK in the early post-war period. Hong Kong's growth and prosperity as a British colony 
alongside a strongly anti-imperialist China appears paradoxical. Yet, this paradox reveals the 
fundamental rational-strategic relations that existed between China and Britain in the early 
Cold War era and how they influenced Hong Kong's economic development. The historical 
contingencies and British colonial strategy/rationale (such as maximising the empire's 
interests, and minimising the kingdom's management resources) were surely the important 
predispositions which constrained the colonial state's selective interventions on the economy 
ofHK. 
• ( 
In the domestic context, the British hongs (in Commercial and financial sector) have 
been the dominant agents in the HK political economy. Their rational strategic actions have 
been oriented towards the British Cabinet and the colonial state elite in Hong Kong. The 
taipans and most of the high-rank government officials shared their community life in the 
prestigious clubs such as the Hong Kong Club and Hong Kong Jockey Club. Moreover, 
most of the directors of the hongs maintained good relationship with the British Cabinet. 
In the institutional aspect, by customs, there were several seats in the Executive and/or 
Legislative Councils preserved for the representatives of the Jardines, the Swire, as well as 
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the Hong Kong and Shanghai Bank. Hence, under the colonial institutional setting, the British 
hongs were very influential on the HK government's policy orientation. On the other hand, 
the local Chinese manufacturers and owners of small workshops situated at the dependent and 
marginal power positions in HK. All these Chinese people were relatively poor-organised in 
comparing with those British business elite. The main functions/aims of the governmental 
institutions were to facilitate the trading activities of the British hongs in China and nearby 
Asian countries. 
Above all, as HK has been fatefhlly located near one of the centers of global political 
economic conflicts, it could not avoid being a strategic arena in which the superpowers 
struggled for their own interests. HK residents had no say in the domestic political system, 
sovereignty of the territory, constitutional reform, economic policy, foreign affairs, and many 
other issues. On their part, both Britain and PRC would not allow the HK people to disturb 
the strategic equilibrium which they had built together after a period of difficult time with 
great effort. 
HK’s economic conditions were unstable during the period (1940s -- 50s) because the 
Korean War syndrome disturbed entrepot trade, and manufacturing industries had not 
matured. The HK government's rationale of minimal governance was conservative, 
incremental, and with a colonial mind-set. In other words, it would not devote too much 
resources and commitment to a "borrowed place in a borrowed time". Stability and British 
interests were the major principles guiding the colonial government policies; no doubt, the 
Execo and Legco, with their corporatist nature, also had a role in formulating pro-business 
policies, especially for the commerce/finance sector. 
The economic policy of the colonial government (in the 1950s-60s) was formulated 
under the constraints provided by the paradoxical relations between China and Britain. The 
CODE-2MPHIL.SAM 
P-24 
development of the colony's economy should not be viewed as an independent unit, nor is 
there a "Hong Kong model" which can be applied to other developing nations, for its 
development was embedded in a particular historical matrix. 
2.2. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
Hong Kong was colonized by Britain in 1842 with the major aim of consolidating the 
British merchants' power in the China trade. From its inception as a British colony, Hong 
Kong became increasingly incorporated into the world political economy. Before the two 
World Wars broke out, Hong Kong's incorporation (similar to the Singapore's case) was 
mainly based on its role as an East Asian entrepot. Hong Kong was a trans-shipment point 
for the British hongs' exports to China and other parts of the region, as well as for Chinese 
goods，financial and services transactions with the core nations in Europe and North America. 
Despite the massive disruption of entrepot trade by the Japanese occupations of the territory 
(1941-45), and the violent civil war on the Chinese mainland, two-thirds of Hong Kong's 
exports (mostly re-exports) were to China along the firsthalf of the 20th century. 
/ ” 
China's commercial relationship with Britain from 1949 onwards began with the 
CCPs policies and actions regarding private British hongs inside China. Initially CCP tried to 
reverse the historical trend by restoring Chinese control over institutions and practices which 
had been identified as manifestations of Western encroachment of China's sovereignty and 
independence. This indicated the sign of national liberation which implying the power and 
ability to eliminate foreign domination over the key sectors of economy. The British 
1 Phelps Brown, E.H., "Hong Kong Economy: Achievements and Prospects", in Hong 
KonS'- the Industrial Colony，ed. by K. Hopkins, (H.K.: Oxford University Press, 1971). 
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government at first hoped that the CCP might face insurmountable economic weakness which 
the West could utilise to their advantage. Later UK recognised that it lacked strong cards in 
this respect. It combined with the US policy of containment following the start of Cold War. 
Hence Britain was driven to an increasing reliance on export restrictions (when the Korean 
War broke out) as political tension mounted. *2 
At the dawn of the Cold War, the large expatriate-British hongs (such as the Hong Kong and 
Shanghai Bank, Jardine, Matheson & Co” Butterfield & Swire Co” British Telecom), which 
had gained their competitiveness by relying on the hurricane of British colonialism in China, 
became aware of the potential threat against their capital in China. Hence they made several 
actions : 
—(i) They did a lot of lobbies in London in order to get the full oversight from the British 
Cabinet. *3 
-(ii) They diversified their capital and investments to other Asian territories, and even other 
continents (such as South America, Africa, Australia, India). *4 
-(iii) Most of them consolidated their regional headquarters in Hong Kong, since they 
engaged in finance and trade related to Hong Kong, as an entrepot (before the Cold War) and, 
> -
later on, as an export-oriented manufacturing centre. From the early days of their arrival in 
the 19th century, members of these hongs were co-opted into the colonial power structure 
through the appointment system to the Legislative and Executive Councils in Hong Kong.*5 
2 British Public Record Office, opened files on colonial affairs, 1945-60, collected by, 
Shao，W.G., China, Britain and Businessmen, (Macmillan, 1991)，pp. 1-23. 176-183 
3 Ibid. 
“ Jardine, Metheson & Co. Ltd. Annual Report 1961. 
Tang，C.C., Social Leaders in Hong kong and Macau (Hong Kong Associated 
Press, 1958), pp.2-6. — 




These British hongs considered colonial Hong Kong as a relatively safe spot and commercial 
foothold in the mouth of China. When better days come, they would be the pioneers 
(vis- vis the American and Japanese) to exploit the Asian markets.枱 
At the British government level, retention of Hong Kong as a colony was seen as a 
matter of prestige which was important to the empire in the post World War II era. Churchill's 
consideration in 1943 was that Britain did not acquire any new territory or bases, but it did 
intend to hold on what they had in East Asia, especially Singapore and Hong Kong. *7 
In addition, the British Colonial Office provided several assertions in respect with 
Hong Kong (to influence the British Cabinet's decision): 
(i) It estimated in 1949 that the total amount of British capital in Hong Kong was about 156 
million pounds. *8 At the same time, a large portion of Hong Kong's reserve was invested in 
London as non-fixed assets.*9 
(ii) The colony was also a good operation base for British hongs to prevent Japan from 
getting a dominant position in the markets of the Far East in future. Therefore, Hong Kong 
had a substantial economic value for Britain. 
(iii) Britain's chief assets in China were her physical properties and businesses owned by 
British private hongs *丨，and the possession of Hong Kong. But Britain was not in the power 
British Public Record Office, opened files on colonial affairs, 1945-60, collected by, 
Shao，W.G., China，Britain and Businessmen, (Macmillan, 1991) pp. 1-23; 176-183. 
Roger Louis, Wm, Imperialism at Bay 1941-45, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1977) 
p.285. 
Tang，J. T.H., "From Empire Defence to Imperial Retreat: Britain's Postwar China 
Policy and the Decolonization of Hong Kong", Modern Asian Studies, 1994 no 28 2 
pp.317-337. 
WU’ C丄.，’’Non-fixed Assets of H.K. Government", H.K. Economic Papers No 12 
July, 1978. 
There were many British hongs invested in China before the Korean War, to name a 
few，such as the Jardine,Matheson & Co. Ltd., Hong Kong & Shanghai Bank, Butterfield & 
Swire Co., British-owned China Engineers Co. Ltd., International Export Corporation Ltd., 
Shell Company of China Ltd., Price's (China) Ltd., Standard-Vacuum Oil Co., Texas Co.' 
(China) Ltd., Frost Blend and Co. Ltd., Shanghai Dockyards, Mollers Engineeering and 
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position to exploit these assets to the full and compete in the China market until the British 
domestic economy was revived. Therefore Britain ought to made a strong will to keep Hong 
Kong for the future.*11 
The rise of Chinese communism presented a dilemma for British Policy-makers. On 
the one hand, they had to show paying effort with their US ally who was actively engaged in 
the Cold War *12 with the communist bloc; on the other hand, they had to consider the 
British hongs' interests in China and Hong Kong. China most probably faced the same 
dilemma. It required resources for the state building (and colonial Hong Kong was a 
convenient linkage point with the outside world) on the one hand; it needed to resolved the 
strong domestic anti-colonial spirit on the other hand. In 1949，the communist regime 
successfully established in China. Thus Hong Kong's political position would depend on 
Britain's relations with the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). British Cabinet considered that 
CCP would use a British Hong Kong for trading purposes, but the colony would face the 
refugee problem most probably. *13 After careful consideration, Britain took the policy of 
"keeping a foot in the door" in China. It sought de facto relations with the CCP because of 
British trading interests and assets in China and Hong Kong. However it might endanger the 
• ( 
U.K.-U.S. relations. ； 
Shipbuilding Works Ltd., Mackenzie and Co., Shanghai Waterworks Co. Ltd., Shanghai Gas 
Co. Ltd., Shanghai Electric Construction Co. Ltd. (the British Tramway). 
See Shao, W.G., China, Britain and Businessmen, (Macmillan, 1991) pp.59-83. 
Shai, A., Britain and China, 1941-47, (London: Macmillan, 1984) pp.150-151. 
Tang, J., Britain ,s Encounter with Revolutionary China，1949-54, (St. Martin's 
Press, 1992) pp.16-18. 
After the World War II, it became clear that Britain, which lost a lot of resources in 
the war, found it very difficult to be a strong rival to either the United States or the Soviet 
Union as a major power in the new world order. The limit of British power and the growing 
of the Soviet-led communist bloc drove Britain to seek a close U.K.-U.S. alliance in the Cold 
War period. See, Frankel, J., British Foreign Policy 1945-1973’ (Oxford University 
Press., 1975) pp. 189-220. 
Tang, J., Britain rs Encounter with Revolutionary China，1949-54, (St. Martin's 
Press, 1992) pp.32-34. 
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2.3. CONFLICTS BETWEEN CHINA AND THE WEST (KOREAN 
WAR AND COLD WAR� 
Britain stood at a difficult and embarrassed position between the USA and the 
Communist China. By allying closely with the United States, UK. was drawn into a direct 
confrontation with the Soviet-led communist bloc and had to play a full effort in the Cold 
War stage. While maintaining a good working relationship with the CCP (especially when the 
People's Republic of China was inaugurated on 1st October 1949) was crucial to the 
immediate British commercial interests in mainland China *14 After secret negotiation, 
the US president adopted the position that the US should wait until all uncertainties were 
settled, and accepted that Britain would take a different China policy because of its 
commercial assets there.*15 The British Foreign Office announced the diplomatic 
recognition to the People's Republic of China on 6th January 1950. 
The dilemma of Britain's policy towards China became more difficult to handle when 
the Korean War broke out in June 1950 and Communist China involved in it. The US. 
President condemned the North Korean and deployed the US. Seventh Fleet to "neutralize" 
the Taiwan Strait. *16 The British Cabinet intended to give support to the US. front. 
However, UK. worried that the deployment of the Seventh Fleet to the Taiwan Strait might 
lead to the decline of Sino-British relations and provoke the CCP to induce disorder in Hong 
Kong. *17 
14 In 1949, the total trade between China and the U.K. was 6.95 million pounds 
(about HK$109.8 million) 
in 1950，it increased to 13.9 million pounds (about HK$ 219.6 million), 
in 1951, it decreased to 10.39 million pounds (about HK$ 164.2 million), 
in 1952, it further decreased to 7.63 million pounds, 
the fall was due to the Korean War. 
Source: Shao, W.G., China，Britain and Businessmen, (Macmillan, 1991)p.64. 
N. Bernkopf Tucker, Pattern in the Dust: Chinese-American Relations and the 
Recognition Controversy, 1949-1950, (New York: Columbia Press, 1983) chl-2. 
6 Lowe, P., Origins of the Korean War, (London: Longman, 1986) chl-2. 
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In May 1951, the UN Assembly adopted a resolution on a strategic embargo. In June 1951， 
Britain imposed exports controls to China, Hong Kong and Macao. Beijing condemned both 
the US. and Britain. The Sino-British relations froze (however surprisingly, the British 
diplomats were still allowed to stay in China, and the informal diplomatic links were kept).*18 
Until 1954，the Sino-British relations had no obvious improvement (although the Korean 
conflict was relaxed in 1953) *19. Hong Kong entered a very troublesome period as a 
consequence of the Korean War and the deepening of the Cold War. CCP made no serious 
actions to arouse disorder in Hong Kong, but the UN embargo on China and the imposition of 
export control (for strategic goods) on Hong Kong caused very damaging effect on the 
colony's economy. 
Although the Cold War atmosphere was serious, the importance of maintaining an 
economic relationship with the capitalist world was not ignored in Mao's era. The CCP 
recognised that Hong Kong could work as a good channel linking China with the capitalist 
world. Hence it left the colony in British hands in 1949 at a time when it could easily have 
taken H.K. by force. During the Korean War period, PRC imported most of its strategic 
supplies from and via Hong Kong. Although the UN embargo prevented a rapid development 
of ties with the capitalist world, PRC continued to export to the capitalist world through Hong 
Kong. Moreover, significant quantities of strategic supplies were smuggled into China 
through Hong Kong. *20 
Tang, J., Britain ,s Encounter with Revolutionary China, 1949-54, (St Martin's 
Press, 1992) ch3-4. 
18 
Shao, W.G., China, Britain and Businessmen, (Macmillan, 1991) ch3-4. 
19 The Geneva Conference in 1954 provided the opportunity for meetings between the 
British Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden and the Chinese Foreign Minister Zhou Enlai, then 
the two governments agreed to establish formal diplomatic relations. See Tang, J., 
Britain's Encounter with Revolutionary China，1949-54, (St. Martin's Press, 1992) ch3-4. 




With the illustration of some statistical data, we can realise the strong mutual 
economic relations between Hong Kong and China. From 1931 to 1938，37% of Hong 
Kong's imports came from China. During the same period, the Chinese market accounted for 
40% of Hong Kong's exports. *21 After the Second World War, China conducted most of its 
trade through Hong Kong and the Hong Kong-China trade recovered to the pre-war level. 
PRC's vigorous buying prior to, and during, the Korean War, and the closure of major 
Chinese ports after 1949, led to Hong Kong's exports to PRC increased three times (during 
1948-50). It accounted for about 38% of total Chinese imports. Hong Kong's imports from 
China also rose to 25% of total Chinese exports in 1950. However, due to the UN embargo 
started from May 1951，Hong Kong's share of China's exports fell from 25% in 1950 to 11% 
in 1955. *22 
In addition to the UN embargo, the CCP practised the import-substitution economic 
policy which resulted in a drastic cut in the import of consumer goods from foreign nations 
(except the trade with other communist countries). China arranged most of its buying of 
capital goods through East Berlin. Hong Kong's exports to China fell in the 1950s. 
The pattern of Hong Kong's imports from China was very different. PRC ought to 
earn the hard currency (since renminbi was inconvertible) by exporting to Hong Kong (Hong 
Kong dollars was linked with the Sterling pounds during 1950s - 1960s). Hong Kong's 
imports from PRC grew in the late 1950s, accounted for 11% of PRC's exports. *23 
Tom, C.F., Entrepot Trade and the Monetary Standards of Hong Kong，1842-1942， 
(University of Chicago Press, 1957). 





Along the turbulent years mentioned above, Chinese government fully realised the 
key economic function of Hong Kong, although it did not recognise the validity of the three 
unequal treaties between China and Britain*24. And it insisted that Hong Kong (including the 
Hong Kong Island, Kowloon and New Territories) was Chinese territory, it handled the 
question of Hong Kong with great care. The CCP leaders mentioned privately in 1948 that 
the CCP did not intend taking back the colony by force but would treat it as a diplomatic 
issue. The question of Hong Kong would not be settled at once but that a long-term view 
would be adopted. *25 
In the Cold War era, the CCP obviously faced a dilemma: on the one hand it ought to 
promote the theme of national liberation in respect with the status quo of Hong Kong; on the 
other hand it did not wish to confront with Britain politically over the question of Hong Kong 
when the main target for its diplomatic offensive was the United States. The colony played 
an essential role for the CCP丨s state building and for maintaining the Sino-British commercial 
relations for many years to come. On the way to keep the colonial Hong Kong, London was 
folly aware of the colony's vulnerability if Beijing were determined to take it back. *26 
Without the CCP's implicit agreement, it would be impossible to maintain Hong Kong as a 
trading port under the British administration, even though the Hong Kong garrison wa§ 
reinforced in 1949. *27 
The three treaties which Britain concluded with China in the 19th century defined the 
geographical boundary of Hong Kong as a colony, and have sustained its legal status : (i) the 
1842 Treaty of Nanking under which Hong Kong Island was to be ceded in perpetuity to 
Britain; (ii) the 1860 Convention of Peking which resulted in Stonecutters Island and the 
Kowloon Peninsula being ceded in perpetuity to Britain; (iii) the 1898 Convention 
Respecting an Extension of the Hong Kong Territory under which the area known as the New 
Territories was leased to U.K. for a 99-year term ending on 1st July 1997. See Endacott, 
G.B., A History of Hong Kong, 2nd.ed, 1973. 
Tsang, S., Hong Kong Constitutional Development，1949-52 (D.Phil, dissertation, 
Oxon, 1986.), pp.124-190. 




In sum, during the interactions between Britain and PRC, Britain's expected payoffs in 
actively maintaining HK as a British colony were that (1) HK could be a temporary capital 
shelter and Asian regional business center, as well as a foothold for business in China in the 
future, for many British hongs (such as the Jardine & Matheson，the HK & Shanghai Bank, 
Butterfield & Swire，etc.)； (2) HK could be an important information center for American and 
British intelligence agents in surveillance of Communist China *28; 
and (3) HK could be a promising source of capital for strengthening the sterling pound and 
the London stock market *29. 
On the other hand, in China's considerations, the expected payoffs in allowing Britain to 
maintain a de facto administration and the status quo were that (1) a British HK could be a 
convenient source of foreign exchanges, technological transfer, and resource inflows *30; 
(2) HK could serve as a channel linking China with the capitalist world (even if the Cold War 
atmosphere became tense); and (3) Communist China could trade with the capitalist world 
through colonial HK. Moreover, a significant amount of strategic supplies could possibly be 
smuggled into China through Hong Kong even if China were to be in conflict with the West. 
氺31 
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Tang, J. T.H., "From Empire Defence to Imperial Retreat: Britain's Postwar China 
Policy and the Decolonization of Hong Kong", Modern Asian Studies, no.28, 2, 1994. 
pp.317-337. 
Lo Ah, Zhengzhibu Huiyilu, [Memories of Special Branch RHKPJ (in Chinese), 
Overseas Chinese Archives, HK Institute of Asia-Pacific Studies, Chinese University ofHK, 
1996，chaps. 3-4. 
’ Beginning in 1954, over HK$300 million of non-fixed assets (from the HK 
government's foreign reserves) was invested in London. See C.L. Wu, "Non-fixed Assets of 
the HK Government," HK Economic Papers, no. 12, (July 1978): 76-91. 
HK has been an open market of foreign exchanges; i.e., the coexistence of sterling 
area regulations and the free exchange of certain currencies. See Frank King, History of the 
Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking Corporation, vol.4，(Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1991)，chap.8. 




2.4. HONG KONG�FLUCTUATING ECONOMY AND THE 
COLONIAL MINIMAL GOVERNMENT 
The strategic relations between China and Britain, as outlined above, constituted an 
important matrix upon which the colonial government of Hong Kong formulated its 
fundamental economic policy orientation, The Hong Kong government could not take a 
highly interventionist profile on the domestic economy, since it ought to consider Beijing's 
and London's will, the limited capability (such as in financial resources) of the colonial state, 
as well as the "thin" legitimacy of the colonial regime. The colonial government did not 
actively help the local industrial sector, since most of the unofficial members of the Executive 
and Legislative Councils represented the interests of the British and local commercial and 
financial communities. They could not possibly have been enthusiastic about the interests of 
the not-so-well-developed manufacturing sector. In addition, they had no trust on the Chinese 
entrepreneurs of small firms. 
Hong Kong government was coined as 丨，a minimal colonial state" since the 19th 
century. *32 As a colonial principle, British government believed that a very simple form of 
administration, that is, a minimal state backed by military forces, would satisfy the needs of 
• r 
the inhabitants, especially for the British merchants.�- The "thin" political legitimacy of the 
colonial state was a serious limit to its capability to expand its financial sources. Fortunately, 
taxation on imports and exports (via the Customs Department on several items of goods) 
provided a promising source of revenue along most of the time (except during the high tide of 
the UN embargo). 
Just after World War II，the financial strength of Hong Kong government was low and 
with deficit budget in 1946. London had no strong intention to give help, moreover, the War 
Scott, I.，Political Change and the Crisis of Legitimacy in Hong Kong, (H.K.: 
Oxford University Press, 1989) ch.2. 
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Office (in London) requested H.K. to refund the British military expenditure to UK. *33 
Although the British government was not so helpful, the biggest bank in Hong Kong - Hong 
Kong and Shanghai Bank - was willing to support the colonial government in the critical 
moment. *34 
In the recovery period, the colonial government rejected the provision of low interest 
loan to any local industries, nor did it grant the preference on locally produced goods. 
"Council considered the question of granting financial assistance in the form of low interest 
loans to local industries, with particular reference to an application from the Diaward Steel 
Works. After discussion Council advised that circumstances in H.K. did not justify 
Government's intervention into the field of commercial finance and that the application from 
the Diaward Steel Works should be rejected.,“. Council considered an application by the 
H.K. Brewery and Distillery Ltd., for an increase on the preference of locally produced 
denatured industrial alcohol. After discussion, Council advised and His Excellency the 
Governor ordered that the application should be refused." (Executive Council minutes file 
no. A6/23, 25 Nov. 1947’ p.298) ， 
At that period (from the mid 1940s to 1950s) most of the Unofficial members of the 
Executive and Legislative Councils represented the interests of the British and local 
commercial and financial communities. They would not suggest the government to put 
resource to support the manufacturing sector. For examples, Arthur Morse was the Chairman 
and Chief Manager of the Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking Corporation; D.F. Landale was 
a director of the Jardine, Matheson and Company; ES. Cassidy was a director of John D. 
Hutchison and Company; C.C. Roberts was a director of Butterfield and Swire Limited in 
: Govemor' M.A. YounS address] It is necessary for the Government to refund to the War Office 
toe amount due in respect of their pay and allowance together with a pension contribution …The total 
expenditure other than expenditure on rehabilitation is expected to be in the neighbourhood of 75 million 
dollars and that against this our revenue for the eleven months will probably be under 40 millions dollars “ 
(H.K. Hansard, 16 May 1946，pp.20-21) ‘ 
34 一 
"[The Attorney General, G.E. Strickland address] The enactment of the measure has been approved by 
the Secretary of States and agreed to by the Committee in London .... 16 million dollars of the issue should be 
pnmded for by the Bank and that the total amount oflhe notes payable to bearer on demand which may be in 
circulation against approved securities under Section 11 of the Hong Kong and Shanghai Bank Ordinance 1929 
f0 u l d ac^rdmgly be raised from 30 million dollars to 46 millions dollars. The rest of the issue will be covered 
by a certifcate ofindebtness issued by Government." (H.K. Hansard, 16 May 1946, p.46) 
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H.K.; M.C. Blaker was a taipan of Gilman and Company H.K. Limited; M.K. Lo was a 
director of China Light and Power Company Limited; T.N. Chau was a director of the Hong 
Kong Electric Company Limited; S.N. Chau was the chairman and managing director of 
Hong Kong Chinese Bank Limited; M.M. Watson was a director of the Broadcast Relay 
Service H.K. Ltd.*35 These enterprises, those Unofficials represented, were just eager in 
recouping their wartime losses and re-organising their investments in Asia. Most of them had 
a wide-scope world view, they considered Hong Kong was a foothold (or offshore business 
headquarter). They further expandednheir global businesses from it. 
J , 
The domestic condition can be explained more satisfactory if we put together with the 
historical and international context (mentioned in previous sections). We can understand 
’’deeper" the economic fluctuation and path of development of Hong Kong in the turbulent 
era. The international relations (in trade and political dimensions) between China and western 
nations were not stable. Hence, entrepot trade in Hong Kong was affected seriously. Although 
Britain's intention to keep the colony was strong, the government of Hong Kong was still 
worried about how long its regime could last for (alongside with the strongly anti-imperialist 
China). Moreover, it is understandable that the colonial state had no responsibility to take 
much care on the huge size of Chinese refugees in Hong Kong. Therefore, social welfare 
provision was minimal. When the colonial government had accumulated a certain amount of 
capital (from 1945 to 1950), rather than using most of it on public works and social welfare 
for Hong Kong people, it preferred to put a large portion of it as non-fixed assets invested in 
London. 
Tang，C.C.，Social Leaders in Hong Kong and Macau, (Hong Kong Associated 
Press, 1958) pp.2-6. 
Also see the appendix ***** in this paper. 
The Newspaper Enterprise Ltd., 1950，Hong Kong Directory 1949, 
CODE-2MPHIL.SAM 
P-36 
The macroeconomic conditions of HK in the period (mid 1940s to mid 1950s) can be 
summarised as following ( and see table A, p^ /)— 
The financial capability of the colonial government was unstable. The revenue 
growth rate was fluctuating (the maximum was 310%, the minimum was -0.15%). One of the 
reasons (for the fluctuation of revenue growth rate) was that the GDP growth rate of Hong 
Kong was also unstable along this period (max. 31.6%, min. -7.5%). This unstability can, in 
turn，be explained by the turbulent conditions for trade between the East and the West via 
Hong Kong during the Cold War anfd Korean War period. This period was also the critical 
time for Hong Kong transforming from an entrepot-oriented to export-oriented economy. 
The growth rate of revenue reached its lowest point in 1951 (that is -0.15%). It was 
obviously disturbed by the UN embargo. However, the revenue as % of GDP was relatively 
stable along the period ( max. 12.63%, min. 8.81%). 
A surprising finding from table A shows that the colonial government itself had not 
much confidence on Hong Kong's future. H.K. government's overseas (mainly in London) 
non-fixed assets as percentage of H.K. GDP increased from 1.74% in 1950 to 4.86% in 1951. 
The rate of this increase was 179.3%. This tremendous increase (transferring Hong Kong's 
reserve to London) can be explained by the fact that the United Nations (including US and 
UK) imposed embargo on mainland China, Hong Kong and Macao in 1951. Most probably， 
Britain was afraid that a revenge from PRC might happen at any time. 
The colonial government's expenditure growth rate was, more or less, fluctuating 
(max. 119%, min. 0.96%) as same as the revenue growth rate (with the same reason for that 
of the revenue pattern). The expenditure as % of GDP was kept below 11.3% and was 
relatively stable along the period. 
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However, the government did try a certain effort to support the declining economy 
through the increase in public expenditure. When the Hong Kong economy was at the trough 
in 1952 (GDP growth rate -7.5%, GDP per capita growth rate -11.66%), the growth rate of 
government expenditure was 22.6%, which was the highest rate in the period. 
The expenditure on non-recurrent public works as % of GDP was very low (max. 
2.71%，min. 0.13%) comparing with the government overseas non-fixed assets as % of GDP 
(max. 11.44%, min. 1.3%). It shows that the colonial government had not paid serious fixed 
capital input (for example, in improving the infrastructure) to the colony in the period. It 
preferred to put more the colony's reserve as non-fixed assets in London. 
Trade with China declined as the CCP took over on the mainland in 1949. World 
economic conditions were unstable under the atmosphere of Cold War. The private property 
right was not firmly secured in mainland China. Chinese refugees flooded into Hong Kong. 
The population increased from 1.55 million in 1946 to about 2.26 million by 1950. The H.K. 
government was ill-equipped (and unwilling to spend much resources, no significant increase 
in the expenditure on public works as % of GDP) to deal with the influx. The refugees had to 
suffered from very poor living conditions. 
From 1954-55, the expenditure on public works increased to above 2% of GDP. It was 
because the Shek Kip Mei fire (broke out on the Christmas Eve of 1953), the government 
began to pay more effort on providing public housing. 
For maintaining social order and stability, the colonial government just only 
intervened on the basic food supply and the cost of public goods. 
"Council discussed measured for reducing the cost of living in H.K.. After discussion it was 
agreed and His Excellency the Governor ordered, that Council should record its opinion 
subject to the views of the Director, supplies, Trade and Industry, that margins of retail profite 
on controlled commodities should be reduced, and that the utility companies (electric power 
and light and gas) should be asked to review their rates, after it had been ascertained that the 
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rates charged by Government for water were not excessive." 10 SEPT 1947 EXECUTIVE 
COUNCIL (EXECO) MINUTES. ‘ 
"Council advised that the present policy of gradual reduction in prices and margins of profit 
mere particularly in the case of foodstuffs procured by Government and sold on a commission 
basis, should be endorsed." 
22 OCT. 1947, EXECO MINUTES. 
"Council considered the report of the Rice Controller that in view of the increase in the cost of 
rice from Burma, Siam and Egypt, the Colony's rice ration was now being sold at a loss. 
Council advised and His Excellency the Governor ordered that the retail price of rice should 
be increased to 54 cents per catty forthwith." 24 FEB. 1948, EXECO MINUTES. 
The trading activities of Hong Kong recovered not so slow as expected (since 
promoted by the large hongs) after the Second World War . 1947 was a fair year in Hong 
Kong. Imports which totalled about HKS1550 million, showed a rise of 62% over 1946. 
I 
)• 
While exports at HK$1217 million had been 58% over the figures for the previous year. 
Foodstuffs, oils and fats and textiles (mainly made in China) play the leading role in the 
colony's trade. These items comprised almost 50% of imports and exports. While metals, 
chemicals, dyes, tobacco and paperware account for another 25% of the trade. *36 
The British Commonwealth's share of the trade which passed through Hong Kong has 
increased since the war. In 1938 only 16% of the Colony's import trade, and 17% of her 
export trade, was with countries in the Commonwealth [including Malaya, Australia, India， 
etc.]，but in 1947 these figures increased to 28.6% for imports and 29.5% for exports. The 
United Kingdom was the chief source of Empire supplies *37 
Some features (worth to mention) of Hong Kong's trade in 1947 was the increase in 
trade with the United States. Eastern Asia had been compelled to look to the country with the 
largest exportable surplus to supply its needs for manufactured articles. The United States had 
more than doubled their pre-war share of the Far Eastern market. 
Imports through Hong Kong from America were $299 million for 1947，while exports 
to the United States amounted to $152 million. The main export from Hong Kong to the US 
36 HK. HANSARD，19 MAR. 1948，PP.41-42. 
37 H.K. HANSARD，19 MAR. 1948, PP.41 -42. 
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was tun oil, but there had been a severe decline in oil exports during 1947.*38 Another 
feature of Hong Kong's trade was the revival of trade with Japan. Close liaison had been 
maintained with General MacArthur's Foreign Trade Division since early in 1946，and Hong 
Kong had its own representative in Tokyo in 1947.*39 
Small progress was made towards the rehabilitation of industry, since it was still 
handicapped by loss of equipment, lack of raw material and excessive costs. Delivery of new 
equipment was still subject to inordinate delays. Moreover, there were certain comparative 
disadvantages in Hong Kong, such asr limited water supply, and scarcity of suitable sites. *40 
The post-war economic recovery lasted for only five years (1946-50). Due to the 
Korean War effect and UN embargo, 193 registered factories ceased operation in 1951 and 
there was about 30000 workers were unemployed. The Hong Kong Government Annual 
Report noted that an increasing number of Hong Kong people were reduced to a bare 
subsistence level and declared that the Korean War effect had brought Hong Kong to an 
economically impossible situation. *41 
Many related causes deepened the economic crisis of the colony. For many British 
and American capitalists, confidence in the future of the Far East in general and Hong Kong 
in particular was decreasing. Some of them withdrew capital from Hong Kong and Macao. 
The Kuomintang-related banks also withdrew funds from Hong Kong. Increasing amount of 
Hong Kong's revenue was put on defence and maintaining law and order (but it was rarely put 




HonS Kong Annual Reports，1951 -52, H.K. Government Printer. 
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capital for medium- and long-term domestic investment on the one hand, and a sudden pause 
of merchandising originally destined for China on the other hand. *42 
Hong Kong entered a very troublesome period as a consequence of the Korean War 
and the deepening of the Cold War. The UN embargo on China and the imposition of export 
control (for strategic goods) on Hong Kong caused damaging effect on the colony's 
economy.*43 
It was rather a historical contingence that the Communist victory on mainland China 
resulted in a huge flow of capital a^nd entrepreneurs from Shanghai to Hong Kong. The 
J # 
Shanghainese industrialists brought with them the know-how on textiles and advanced 
machines. Together with them were a large pool of skilled and unskilled labour as refugees 
flooded into the small colony. The key factors ofHong Kong's industrial taking-offwere this 
Shanghai capital, entrepreneurship, and technology, as well as the hard working, fast-learning 
and cheap labour. 
42 0 “ “ “ — 
nvf , =0tt，L，. P°!ftical Chan^ — the Crisis ofLegitimacy in Hong Kong, (H K . 
pxford University Press, 1989) pp.67-69. s y 
“ At that time and before, Hong Kong's eonomy was mainly relied on the entrepot trade 
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CHAPTER THREE 一 
THE DYNAMICS OF THE PROCESS OF ECONOMIC 
RESTRUCTURING AND THE STRATEGIES OF THE 
INDUSTRIALISTS (1950s — 1960s) 
3.1. INTRODUCTION 
The theme of this chapter is to delineate the development path of industrialization 
(that is, the economic restructuring from an entrepot economy to a labour-intensive 
( 
manufacturing economy) in Hong itong during the 1950s and 60s. As mentioned in the last 
chapter, there were several contingencies (as pre-conditions) for the rise of industrialism in 
HK, they included: (i) The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) took over power in China and 
built up the People's Republic of China (PRC). Facing the political uncertainty, a great 
number of Chinese entrepreneurs (especially from Shanghai, in textiles and clothing sectors) 
rushed into HK and brought along with their capital, technology and know-how, as well as 
the advanced machines, (ii) There was also a hugh influx of skilled and unskilled labourers 
from the mainland into HK. They constituted the key work force to support industrialization, 
(iii) the UN-cum-US embargo was imposed on PRC in 1951 because the Korean War effect. 
HK's entrepot trade came to a standstill. One of the consequences was that it channelled the 
local resources (including the labour) into manufacturing. All these historical contingencies 
brought together the capital, labour and technology into HK. They were the necessary factors 
for the industrial taking-off in HK. 
The colonial government maintained its independence from the interests of the local 
manufacturers even after they had become the dominant economic force in the colony. Thus 
the structure of Hong Kong can be described as a partial-insulated state, limited 
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representation, and a concentrated and internally cohesive economic decision-making 
structure. The formal governmental authority was in the hands of civil servants who were 
unconstrained by any accountable electoral politics. The government had always drawn a 
line between general supports that resemble pure public goods and sectorial industrial 
guidance. The government's resistance to industrial requests for targeted sectorial policies can 
be seen in the recurrent debate over government financing of industry. In 1958 an unofficial 
member of Legco suggested the formation of a development corporation that would act as a 
brMge between the government and private enterprise. The corporation would assist firms by 
> • 
offering medium- and long-term loans that were difficult for small factories to obtain. A 
committee formed to investigate the idea. It argued that no validity to the claim that working 
capital was unavailable or that interest rates were unreasonably high. *] Further calls for 
government finance and assistance were raised by unofficial members in Legco debates in 
1962 and again in 1968. The proposals were shunted aside as costly and impractical. *2 
However，it did not mean that the government had done nothing in facilitating the economic 
restructuring. The government co-operated with the British hongs in improving the local 
infrastructure, public utilities, banking and financial system, as well as the international trade 
networking. It will be discussed in the next chapter. 
Since the whole framework of this thesis is political-economic, in this chapter I shall 
narrate the economic picture of the industrial growth of Hong Kong. Special attention will be 
paid on textiles, clothing, toys and plastic industries, since these were the major fields of the 
Chinese industrialists in the period. This narration is important for us to understand the 
1 Hong Kong Hansard, 1958, pp.119-120, 142. 
2 Hong Kong Hansard, 1962，pp.138-141. 
Hong Kong Hansard, 1968, p. 162. 
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problems and opportunities which the Chinese entrepreneurs faced with. Base on these, the 
strategies of the industrialists will be analysed. 
Most of the industrialists took Hong Kong as a temporary shelter. It was difficult for them to 
throw away the sense of insecurity. They planned for short- to medium-term of investment. 
Many industrialists pursued adequate instead of maximum profit. They did not want to 
develop further capital-intensive production. They had few expectation on the government 
since it would not provide any direct help any way. The entrepreneurial familism further 
relieved the burden of the government since the family (or extended family) provided the 
^ . 
impetus for innovation and the support for risk-taking. *3 The internal centrifugal force of 
the entrepreneurial family led to the evolution of a system of subcontracting, with the 
production process being divided up and undertaken by multiple, interdependent units. Such a 
system obviously called for co-ordination through economic networks, hence the important 
role of kinship or regional ties. Such a system enhanced Hong Kong industry's flexibility and 
responsiveness to the fluctuation (e.g. the fashion change) in the international market. 
3.2. THE PATH OF FCONOMTC RESTRUCTIJRTNC 
The outbreak of Korean War in June 1950 brought about high consumption of 
materials (food, raw materials, armaments, raw rubber, metal, chemicals, etc.) by countries 
involved. China had to purchase a large amount of these through HK. Thus HK's entrepot 
Wong, Siu-Lun, 1988, Emigrant Entrepreneurs, HK: Oxford U. Press, chap.7. 
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trade reached a high record of HK$9.3 billion in 1950-51 (comparing the amount of $7.5 
billion in 1949-50). *4 
In May 1951，the United Nations announced a strategic embargo against China. It was 
a serious blow to HK's traditional entrepot status. The entrepot trade record in 1951-52 was 
only HK$6.1 billion. The annual growth rates were negative during 1951-55. *5 
The entrepot trade of HK declined deeply after the Korean War. Not only did HK's 
exports to China greatly decrease, but many Southeast Asian countries also reduced the 
handling of their imports and exports by HK middlemen in order to conserve foreign 
exchange for developmental uses and help their own companies and Individuals acquire trade 
experience. During 1954-66, the relative share of re-exports in the total exports of HK 
declined from 64% to 24%, while that of domestic exports (as % of total exports) increased 
from 36% to 76%. *6 Fortunately, along the late 1940s and early 1950s, there was massive 
capital flight (including machines and other assets) to HK from China. One estimate showed 
that this flow of capital financed about two-thirds of the initial expenditures of HK 
manufacturing taking off in the 1950s. *7 The Chinese industrialists (most came from 
f 
Shanghai), who played a prominent role in the process of rapid industrialization, brought with 
them not only the state-of-the-art machinery and technology, but also entrepreneurship (a 
sense of risk-taking courage and commitment in their businesses). The spirit of 
4 Tong-Yung Cheng, Economy of Hong Kong, (HK: Far East Publications, 1985)， 
125-127. 
Shou-Eng Koo, "Role of Export Expansion in Hong Kong's Economic Growth", 
Asian Survey, (volviii, 1968)，499-515. 吧 
See，Shou-Eng Koo, (1968): 499-515. In 1950-51，HK's exports amounted 
HK$4433 million, imports HK$4870 million. By 1954，exports amounted HKS2417 million, 
imports HK$3435 million. 
Shou-Eng Koo, "Role of Export Expansion in Hong Kong's Economic Growth", 
Asian Survey, (vol.viii, 1968), 499-515. ‘ 
Siu-Lun Wong, Emigrant Entrepreneurs: Shanghai Industrialists in Hong Kong, 
(HK: Oxford University Press, 1988)，42-47. 
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entrepreneurship of these immigrant industrialists continues to be a strong feature of HK 
capitalism and it promotes an environment that is favourable to new enterprise formation.*8 
During the mid 1950s，there was a great economic transformation in HK. The newly 
established textile industry developed rapidly and many other kinds of manufacturing also 
appeared. The major industrial districts such as Tsuen Wan and Kwun Tong formed and grew 
rapidly. As a result of this sudden change, both the people and the colonial government had 
to face many problems such as housing, industrial land, water supply, transportation, medical 
and health condition, etc. By the late 1950s, the industrialization of HK had built up a 
strong base. The average growth rate of local industrial production increased 20% annually. 
In 1959，the 啦 0 _ of industrial output for export was In excess of the amount of entrepot 
trade. *9 
However，an open economy made HK vulnerable to changes in policies and to 
recessions in major trading countries (such as the US, UK and West Germany). The world 
recession in 1958 and restrictions placed by importers in HK's textiles resulted in a slowdown 
1 : l Moreover，these Chinese immigrants brought with them a distinctive detennination to 
bmld businesses as family enterprises. Conceiving the firm as a family unit has produced 
strong strength and resilience in the Chinese business enterprise. Family connections extend 
across national boundaries, and as businesses organize network production and locate their 
�sets m geographically separated locations, the ties of trust and kinship substitute for the 
r^nnal institutions and infrastructure that are often lacking in less developed markets See 
Siu-Lun Wong, 1988, chaps. 1, 6, 7. • 
In order to evaluate the speed and magnitude of post-war industrialization, one would 
r^mally turn to industrial production official statistics, but in case of HK this is impossible 
none exist. There is,in fact，a scarcity of published economic statistics of every kind ' 
(about 1940s-1950s), and a total absence of national income accounts until 1961 This 
sm c^^ i is the direct result of HK Government's anarchistic economic policy, which attaches 
™le Value t0 comprehensive economic and social statistics. The major exception to the lack 
of economic statistics is the presence of data for merchandise trade, which are available over 
the entire post-war period and are reliable and comprehensive. This is fortunate for the 
discussion of the industrialization of HK since it is estimated that 80-90% of industrial 
production is exported. The speed and magnitude of the transformation from entrepot trade to 
industry is thus revealed by the growth of domestic exports. See, James Riedel 
Industrialization of Hong Kong, (Germany: J.C.B. Mohr, Paul Siebeck, Tubingen, 1974), 
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of economic growth. In the 1960s another period of rapid growth involved diversification 
away from textiles and into garments and electronics. *10 The GDP per capita was 
HK$1428 in 1950，$1595 in 1955，$1973 in 1960，$2902 in 1965，and $3723 in 1969. The 
rate of growth increase greatly aftpr the mid of 1960s. 
Cheap labour was one of the key factors for the rapid industrial growth. Since most of 
the food was imported from China at the lowest prices available on the world market, it 
contributed to wages in HK that were low by international standards. 
The development of infrastructure in HK in the post-war era should not be ignored. It 
J . 
related with shipbuilding and ship repairing; aircraft maintenance and repair; railway 
workshops; maintenance and repairs for piers and land transport (tunnels, highways, bridges); 
public utilities such as electricity, gas, water, telephone, etc. The growth of this group of 
industries gave rise to the construction of diesel engines, and the manufacture of rope and 
nets，nails, screws, hinges, wire, etc. Although all these industries had been developing 
around the port and entrepot activities of the colony, they proved to be important to the 
employment demand of the massive immigrants in HK. Moreover, they were an essential 
support for the manufacturing. In 1955，they accounted for about 15% of employment in the 
registered factories and workshops in HK, *" The thriving of this industry was related with 
the success of the British hongs such as Jardines and Swire in diversifying their businesses 
from trading to transport engineering, air terminal services, container terminal services. 
The rapid development in the economy brought prosperity to the construction and 
building industry as they became involved in the "housing boom" (in the mid 1960s). The 
total amount of government revenue from public auction of land increased sharply from 
Stephen C. Chow, & Gustav F. Papanek, "Laissez-faire, Growth and Equity - Hong 
Kong", Economic Journal, 91，(June 1981), 466-485. 
Edward Szczepanik, Economic Growth of Hong Kong, (London: Oxford University 
of HK, 1958), 74-75. 
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HK$0.7 million in 1959 to HK$300 million in 1963. Private investment in the building 
industry was amounted to HK$2901 million in 1963. The boom also reinforced the 
development of local industrial sectors such as cement, steel bars, drilling machines, water 
pumps，plumbing, fittings, tubes, glass, chemicals (especially paints), wood processing, metal 
products, furniture, electrical appliances, etc. 
This whole group of industries (in 1950s-60s) absorbed about 27% of HK's labour force 
employed in the registered establishments (not counting the building and construction 
industry itself). *12 , 
J • 
Just as the primary need for shelter stimulated the growth of a number of industries. 
The demand for clothing and food gave the urge to develop the manufacturing of textiles, 
clothing, rubber, footwear, food and beverages. In subtropical climate such as in HK, food 
and beverage consumption led to the growth of the ice and cold storage industry. All these 
industries as a group (in 1960s) absorbed about 48% of the colony's labour force employed in 
the registered establishments. *13 
Housing boom and real estates speculation in the 1960s was accompanied with a 
sharp rise in land prices. Owing to the loose control on banks by the government, banks 
involved themselves deeply in the speculation of real estates. This eventually resulted in the 
crisis of 1965 when many banks suddenly found themselves short of cash. The Canton Trust 
Bank was forced into bankruptcy after a run on the bank. The bank crisis caused a tight 
money condition and a contraction in bank credits. Moreover, land prices were pulled down 
and deflation set into the economy. 
u Tong-Yung Cheng, Economy of Hong Kong, 123-127. And, 
Edward Szczepanik, Economic Growth of Hong Kong, 75. 
Edward Szczepanik, Economic Growth of Hong Kong, 75. 
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While the economy had not yet fully recovered from the banking crisis, a series of 
riots broke out in 1966-67. It was suspected that the Cultural Revolution in PRC was related 
with these riots in HK. People's confidence in HK's future was once again deprived. All these 
produced adverse effects on the local economy. The colonial government set up a special 
team to study the causes of these riots and made some amendments for preventing any further 
riots in the future. 
> 
) 
3.2.1. PROFILE OF TEXTILES TNDTIST^ V 
Textiles (especially cotton weaving) were the foundation of HK's industrialization. 
Cotton weaving was started in the 1920s by local Cantonese weavers on a traditional 
handicraft basis. The introduction of modern technology in textiles was laid by Shanghai 
industrialists who, in 1947-50, brought their machinery and skills from China. *14 Textiles 
was then the largest single manufacturing industry in the 1950s. It took about 31%-44% of 
domestic exports along 1950s, and later, about 10%-23% along 1960s (in a decreasing 
trend). For the employment, textiles absorbed about 29%—34% of working population in the 
1950s, and later about 23%-29% in the 1960s. 
1 Particularly fortunate was the fact that, at the time, many Shanghai industrialists had 
new machinery ordered from the United States and stored in HK godowns awaiting delivery 
to Shanghai. The uncertain political condition in China made the industrialists established the 
textile mills in HK and they were equipped with the most modern machinery. See, James 
Riedel，Industrialization of Hong Kong, (Germany: J.C.B. Mohr, Paul Siebeck, Tubingen 
1974), 26-27. 5 ' 
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Apart from the infusion of capital and entrepreneurial skills from China, the rapid 
expansion of the textiles industry in the 1950s owed a lot to the Commonwealth Preference 
Scheme which gave HK's exporters duty-free access to UK, the largest market at the time, 
which absorbed some 35% of the domestic textiles production in HK. In the 1960s-70s， 
although the industry witnessed a marked decrease in the number of spindles and looms 
installed and the size of the employed work-force, rapid advances in the textile technology 
occurred. Over the years, the industry diversified both vertically and horizontally “ vertically 
from cotton spinning and weaving tor knitting, bleaching and dyeing, stencilling and printing, 
sizing and so on; horizontally from cotton to wool, silk and man-made fibres, from low-count 
spinning to high-count spinning, from grey goods to carpets and rugs, from the production of 
mainly the heavier and coarser types of fabrics such as drills and twills towards greater 
production of the fmer“count and lighter-weight constructions such as poplins and satins. 
These latter fabrics were required in increasing quantities by the local garment industry. *15 
However, the textiles industry in HK long faced challenges from lower-cost Asian 
producers (e.g. Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia, China). As a heavy water- and electricity-
consuming and land-intensive industry, textiles sector was hit hard by the high costs of water, 
electric power and factory accommodation, as well as by increasing competition from the 
low-wage less developed countries. 
In addition, trade in cotton textiles had been subjected to a multiplicity of trade 
restrictions and controls along the period. The first severe blow to rapid growth of textiles 
came in 1959 when the Lancashire Pact was imposed to stabilise cotton textile exports to UK. 
I卩 the following two years, many other importing nations followed suit by resorting to 
' The raPid expansion of the local garment industry during the 1960s-70s stimulated 
product research by local weavers into the production of speciality fabrics such as dobby 
weaves and fancy poplins. See, Yin-Ping Ho, Trade, Industrial Restructuring and 
Development in Hong Kong，(London: Macmillan Press, 1992), 165-167. 
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various protective measures. The institutionalisation of non-tariff barriers on a multilateral 
basis first came in 1961 and 1962, when the Short Term Arrangement and then the Long 
Term Arrangement Regarding International Trade in Cotton Textiles (STA and LTA) were 
formulated consecutively under the GATT. The LTA was extended in 1967 and again in 
1970. During the LTA years, HK had already concluded a variety of bilateral agreements 
with its major trading partners, including the US, the EEC, Canada, Finland, Norway, 
Sweden and Australia. *16 
The cotton textile production in HK roughly doubled in size (in 1957-62) although 
J , 
under the trade restraints. Most of the additional yarn being produced was sold in the markets 
of China and HK. Exports fell from 33% to 18% of output between 1956-60. *17 The trade 
restraints on textiles induced the forward linkages with the finishing and gannents sectors. 
Moreover, the HK textiles industry moved increasingly into the production of synthetic 
fabrics and yarns. Incentive was provided to increase domestic value-added and thereby 
increase the return under the imposed quota. *18 In 1961-62, the spinning sector covered 
some 30 firms, mostly large, with altogether about 600 000 spindles and a labour force of 
over 19 000. Export sales were concentrated on South East Asia. *19 
In 1974，the LTA was replaced by the arrangement governing International Trade in 
Textiles, better known as the Multifibre Arrangement (MFA), which reprsented an extension 
of restrictions to non-cotton textiles. The MFA was extended in 1977, 1981, and 1986. 
Instead of liberalising access, the bilateral agreements reached under the successive MFAs 
have grown progressively more restrictive. See, Yin-Ping Ho, Trade, Industrial 
Restructuring and Development in Hong Kong, (London: Macmillan Press, 1992) 168-169. 
And，James Riedel, Industrialization of Hong Kong, (1974) 26-27. 
Economist Intelligence Unit Ltd.(London)，1962, Industry in Hong Kong, p viii 
18 James Riedel, (1974), 26-27. 
19 Economist Intelligence Unit Ltd.(London)，（1962)，.vii. 
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For the foreign markets structure, UK took the largest share ofHK's export of textiles 
(about 20% —36% along 1960-70). The US was the second largest one (taking 15%--21% 
along the same period). Australia was in the third (taking 5%--10%). *20 
3.2.2, PROFILE OF CLOTHING INDUSTRY 
Clothing industry became more significant after the end of 1950s. Clothing accounted 
for about 18% of total domestic ^ )orts in 1956，but it increased to 35% in 1968; while 
textiles accounted for 45% in 1956, but it decreased to 13% in 1968. Since the early 1960s 
clothing industry had overtaken the textiles to become the largest foreign exchange earner 
and employer in the manufacturing sector. The clothing industry kept pace with the rest of 
manufacturing only through continual adjustment to changing international market 
conditions. In the early 1950s the bulk ofHK's clothing exports (largely to the US) were of 
low quality knitwear. However, the protectionism in the West in the early 1960s provided a 
push for local manufacturers to up-grade quality, and increased value-added in order to 
maximise their return under the quota. In the 1960s, because of the slow growth of the 
domestic textile finishing sector and the only late development of domestic synthetic fabric 
production, HK relied largely on Japan for the supply of fabrics. *21 
Because of the relatively low capital requirements and ease of entry, the non-knit 
clothing, gloves and knitwear production grew at a phenomenal rate. From the late 1950s, the 
whole clothing sector was over-expanded, the number of firms continuing to increase even 
during the recession of early 1961 when employment and output were falling. The problems 
20 Yin-Ping Ho, (1992) 168. 
21 James Riedel, (1974)，28-29. 
code -- 3mphil.sam 
p-54 
of the clothing industry were lack of marketing and excessive concentration on a few export 
markets (USA, UK, West Germany). *22 
About the market outlets, the US had long been the largest market for HK's clothing. 
Its share of the industry's exports about 35% - 39% along 1960-70. The second largest 
market was UK, it took about 14% -21% of HK's clothing exports along the same period. 
West Germany was the third largest one, it consumed about 8% — 15% of HK's clothing. *23 
In order to regain the competitiveness, clothing industry in HK diversified 
horizontally from basic apparel such as knitted underwear, nightwear, sweatshirts, trousers 
and shorts of denim, children's clothing, gloves, mittens and the like, to well-tailored 
outerwear, stylish slacks, modish swimwear, fashionable brassieres and ladies' outfits made 
of fUr，silk or leather, and high fashion dresses of many different kinds. Owing to the GATT 
formulation of the LTAs in the 1960s and early 1970s, there was a marked trend towards 
diversification within clothing exports from cotton items into man-made fibres. *24 
3.2.3. PROFTT E OF TOYS AND PT ASTTC TNmiSTPV 
The first plastic factory was established in HK in 1947，since then, the industry kept 
pace with the growth of the economy. It had a more or less same percentage of domestic 
exports with textiles from the late 1960s. *25 The perfonnance (growth rate of output) of 
plastic industry was excellent especially in the 1958-68. The value of output exceeded 
HK$300 million in 1960, and recorded employment approaching 18 000. Small firms 
Economist Intelligence Unit Ltd.(London)，（1962)，.ix. 
Yin-Ping Ho, (1992) 171. 
But with the introduction of the MFA in the mid-1970s，this trend has reversed See 
Yin-Ping Ho, (1992) 169-170. • ， 
25 James Riedel, (1974)，29-30. 
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developed across the sectors of flowers, toys and miscellaneous goods. However, the export 
organization was weak and there was no close co-ordination between raw material suppliers, 
manufacturers and exporters. About 70% of plastic flower exports went to the US and the rest 
went to UK, Australia and Canada. However, the industrialists were poor at marketing, price 
policy and product design. After try-and-error? toy exports later concentrated on high-income 
markets. *26 
There had been a steady shift away from plastic flowers and foliage and towards 
plastic toys and dolls. This shift was also part of an overall move within the plastic industry 
to more sophisticated products and higher value-added. By the end of 1960s，HK had 
established itself as the world's second largest toy producer and exporter. In addition to 
artificial flowers and toys, the plastic industry produced household decorations, household 
utensils and polyethylene bags. In the end of 1960s, these articles accounted for about 34% of 
total plastic output. Only 62% of the total plastic output were exported. An important share of 
polyethylene bags and sheeting production was used domestically in the packaging of 
manufactured goods. The major market for the plastic goods was the US (absorbed about 
62% in 1960s). *27 
In the 1950s, over 75% of the raw material inputs for the plastic industry (mainly 
polythene and polystyrene) came from Japan. However, in the 1960s, Japan's domestic 
demand for plastic raw materials was too great to allow her to supply HK. Then, the US and 
UK became the major suppliers. The distribution and sales of raw materials followed the 
traditional HK pattern, i.e., with importers selling directly to larger plastics moulders in the 
industry and to smaller establishments through wholesalers. *28 
2 Economist Intelligence Unit Ltd.(London), (1962)，ix. 
27 James Riedel, (1974), 29-30. 
2 Deborah Trenerry, "Hong Kong's Plastic Industry", Far Eastern Economic Review 
vol.xxxvii, 1962，305. ’ 
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The plastic industry was unique among other manufacturing industries in HK in that it 
employed locally produced machinery. It claimed that virtually all the many hundreds of 
simple, hand-operated injection moulding machines were made in HK. In 1968, it was 
established that production in machinery for the plastic industry accounted for more than 50% 
of the total value of domestic machinery production. The local supply of moulds, at cost 
below those in many other nations, contributed to the competitiveness of plastic industry. *29 
About the market structure of HK's domestic plastic exports, US took 53.4% in 1960， 
and 61.5% in 1970; UK took 22.5% in 1960，and 10.6% in 1970. While for the commodity 
structure of domestic plastic exports, plastic toys and dolls accounted for 38.2% in 1960; and 
57.4% in 1970. Plastic flowers production accounted for 56.5% in I960, and 27.4% 
inl970 *30 In respect of production arrangements and techniques, most of the plastics 
factories in HK remained small in size and could not adopt capital intensive modes of 
production. They confined themselves to either contract production or proprietary products. 
3.3. STRATEGIES OF THE CHINESE INDUSTRIALISTS 
Under the particular world markets situation, Hong Kong industrialists faced with 
particular chances and constraints. With the increasing international institutional barriers, the 
HK's textiles manufacturing was forced to diversify into other productions and markets. Since 
most of the factories in HK were in small- or medium-size, and with high flexibility, they 
were more likely to survive in the fast-changing consumer-tastes in world markets. Many of 
these factories had good relations with the British trading hongs and who could help the 
29 James Riedel, (1974)，29-30. 
30 Yin-Ping Ho, (1992)，172-173. 
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Chinese industrialists in exploring the foreign markets and sourcing the machines and parts. 
In addition, the HK government also provided trade promotion functions and upgraded 
infrastructure. 
However, the government had no encouragement to the domestic industrialists to develop 
towards higher-value added, and capital-intensive productions. And neither did the 
industrialists have the motivation to upgrade their production lines. Why ？ 
The strategic considerations of the industrialists were mainly related with the 
following strings — > 
(i) They saw Hong Kong as a temporary shelter (against the Communist China) for making 
money. Most of them did not make capital-intensive production and they limited themselves 
in short-term to medium-term of investment (planned profit return usually around 3 to 5 
years). *31 They simply could not throw away the sense of insecurity in the small colony. 
(ii) The business strategy of the local industrialists was conservative. They were mainly 
clustering around the textiles and clothing, toys and plastic goods, metal products, watches 
and clocks, ..etc. The industrialists did not diversify their foreign markets over years. There 
was no serious capital and technological deepening in the two decades. The government had 
no long-term planning for industrial upgrading. The industrial structure of the colony 
stubbornly entrenched in the labour-intensive production stage. 
(Hi) The class of industrial bourgeoisie had an internal division, therefore they were 
susceptible to the manipulation of the government. The more organised and better endowed 
upper stratum was co-opted and absorbed into the colonial state (as members of the Exco 
and/or Legco). The small industrialists were easily satisfied by the government's policy on 
31 sit，Fung-Shuen & Wong，Siu-Lun, 1989, Small and Medium Industries in an 
Export-Oriented Economy: The Case of Hong Kong, HK: Centre of Asian Studies, 
University ofHK, chaps. 2, 3, 16. 
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suppressing labour cost. *32 In addition, the free trade port legacy of HK provided the 
industrialists many chances to find the sale outlets especially in the US and Europe. This 
position was further strengthened by the favourable conditions in world trade that prevailed in 
the 1950s and 60s. With plenty of profit-making opportunities in the short run, the small 
industrialists would not come to fight for more political power, or government's favourable 
interventions, or other distant goals with uncertain rewards. 
(iv) For the industrialists (especially those escaped from China), the colonial state was 
considered as a necessary evil to prfevent the communist take over. The dominance of the 
British hongs was also taken for granted under the colonial regime. The fear of a change in 
the capitalist status quo immobilised the industrialists into any vigorous political action that 
could push the colonial government to change its industrial policy orientation. Since the 
industrialists satisfied with the generally good business condition, they ignored the needs for 
industrial technology upgrading (which was an issue not of immediate importance for the 
profit-making at that period of time). 
The relationships between the industrialists and the British hongs were not always 
conflictual. In reality, they were in symbiosis in most of the time. The business environment 
of HK in the 1950s and 60s was greatly equipped by the effort of the British hongs. They had 
done a lot of contributions such as in (i) providing banking, insurance and other financial 
services, (ii) trade promotion, marketing, shipping, exploring export outlets for the 
manufactured goods (from HK and China), (iii) improving the transportation such as the 
container terminals, airport, cross-harbour tunnel, and they were beneficial to all economic 
Turner，Herbert, A” 1980，The Last Colony: But Whose ？ A Study of the Labour 
Movement, Labour Market and Labour Relations in HK，Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, chaps. 6-7. 
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sectors (including the manufacturing), (iv) importing the machines and technology from the 
advanced countries, and which could upgrade the productivity ofHK's industries, 
(v) providing telecommunication, electric power, town gas, ferry and tram services. *33 One 
of the reasons for the British hongs to diversify their businesses from entrepot trade was the 
outbreak of Korean War and the UN embargo against China. 
The British hongs had paid great effort in improving the city in many dimensions. In return, 
they earned the monopolies granted by the colonial government for several decades, which 
had brought great wealth for them, r 
J . 
REMARKS -
There can be no question that HK had come a long way since the early post-war years 
when it was still a small entrepot. The economic restructuring of HK in the 1950s was 
triggered by a set of contingent factors which have been discussed in the beginning of this 
chapter. Hence historical contingency should not be ignored. 
The HK government provided a relatively stable business environment (comparing 
with that of China and some Asian countries) which included law and order, basic 
infrastructural support and trade promotion. Under these institutional setting, a particular 
mode of industrial structure formed. However, this initial phase of industrialisation was not 
accompanied by capital and technological deepening. Apparently, the HK government 
ignored most signals for the need of industrial upgrading. The industrial structure of HK 
stubbornly entrenched in the labour-intensive stage. The HK industrialists faced with 
increasing pressures which came from the protectionism of the West, local labour shortage, 
It will be discussed in Chapter Five in detail in this paper. 
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and the increasing competition with the developing countries. Why did the HK government 
not to offer a helping hand ？ What was the particular strategic mind-set of the top 
decision-makers in the colonial government ？ It will be discussed in the coming chapter. 
f 
> , 
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CHAPTER FOUR » 
HONG KONG GOVERNMENTS ROLE AND SELECTIVE 
INTERVENTIONS IN THE ECONOMY 
4.1. INTRODUCTION 
Hong Kong was often coined as a laissez-faire city-state. However, in the following, I 
shall show that it was a myth. With strategic considerations, the colonial government took 
selective interventions in order to maximize the interests of Britain and British hongs. 
The industrial economy of HK became more mature towards 1960s. The local 
industrialists realised that they had to build up collective influence and Fight for their own 
interests. They formed many groups such as the Chinese Manufacturers' Association (CMA) 
and Federation of HK Industries (FHKI). They had tried many ways to announce their 
problems to the colonial government, but they only got negative feedback. The government 
provided few substantial supportive intervention which was specially for manufacturing 
sector. In fact, most of the large-scale interventions were favourable to the 
financial/commercial sector or related fields. The manufacturers faced many problems, such 
as the high rent of land, high labour cost ，shortage of skilled labour, lack of low-interest 
loan (for upgrading the machines). Hence some of them migrated or diversified their 
businesses in nearby Asian countries. Moreover, some tried to change or diversify their 
businesses in other fields (such as land property, real estates, or services sectors). *2 
The industrial wages in HK had gone up (from 1960-70) by more than 120%, and in 
1969-70 by as much as 30%. (HK Hansard, Oct. 1970, p.41) 
There are plenty of examples of these entrepreneurs, such as -
Ann，Tse Kai, the chaireman ofWinsor Industrial, with food and textile 
manufacturing interests as well as property investment. His company has a joint-venture in 
manufacturing in Burma; 
Chan, Ronnie, controlling the Amoy Canning Corporation (HK) Ltd., producing soy 
sauce and canning fruits and vegetables; also owning the Hang Lung Development Co., and 
ks property arm Amoy Properties Ltd., with property in HK and Shanghai, as well as interests 
in car parks, dry cleaning, department stores and restaurants. 
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The colonial government did not provide a helping hand targeted to the industrialists. 
The colonial governor and the top bureaucrats had only a simple instruction from London — 
maintaining the interest of Britain’ especially its trade in Asia. All other jobs could be put 
in second priority (including the well-beings of HK people). 
The decline of Britain's industrial economy and the role of HK as a world export 
champion (started from the late 1950s) created a unique situation in the 1960s that the foreign 
exchange earned by the small HK became an important support to the unwell Sterling empire. 
The direct control of HK's surplus by Britain for its own sake meant the deprivation of the 
J I 
capital for re-investment in HK. Britain did not interest in making investments to upgrade 
the industries in HK if her need on the capital was more urgent. Moreover, Britian did not 
regard that its was worthy to invest too much in HK, given the uncertain political future of 
HK. *3 
The housing policy (after the Shek Kip Mei fire) was partly benevolent and partly 
instrumental. It was an expression of the social paternalism of the government (to take care 
of the needy) within the limits of the budgetary priorities geared towards law and order. In 
addition, the low-rent public housing was taken as a kind of social wage (as supplement to the 
working class people whose labour wages were suppressed generally). *4 
Chao, Kuang Piu, owning the Novel Enterprises, which is involved in the 
manufacture of Knitwear and other clothing, in property, and in marketing through the Pepe 
Group (UK); also owning the ’’ Noveli" brand of jeans; 
Kwok，Ping Sheung, his company is heavily involved in garment manufacturing, 
hotels, properties, telecommunications, etc.; 
Whang, Tar Choung, as the chairman of Lam Soon Food Industries, over 35 years 
operation with food processing, detergents, and trading of electronic and packaging products, 
having branches in Singapore and Malaysia. 
3
 See，Cragg，Claudia, 1996，The New Taipans, London: Arrow Books Ltd., chap.7. 
Far Eastern Economic Reviewf 9 Apr. 1964; 12 Nov. 1964; 10 Oct. 1966; 
30 Nov. 1967; 4 Apr. 1968; 




Moreover, the government was active in trade promotion (and spent a certain amount 
of resources in setting trade promotion offices in major cities in the USA, Europe, Japan, 
Australia, etc.). This attempt should be viewed as (i) to expand and diversify the industrial 
production of HK, and then its revenue; (ii) as a way to deflect HK people's, anger over 
British Protectionism; (iii) to directly cater to the interests of the British hongs and 
commercial sector which had been marketing a large portion of the HK's industrial products 
to overseas. 
Furthermore, the governmeht had paid much effort in land reclamation and 
j . 
construction of infrastructure. But these were not done by the government alone. A lot of 
projects were franchised to the British hongs (e.g. the airport renovation, sea-water 
purification plant, cross-harbour tunnel, highways, container terminals, piers for ferries, 
tram-ways to the Peak, ..etc.). All these achievements were beneficial (if not only) to the 
commercial/financial sector dominated by the British hongs. 
The following table categorised the colonial government's interventions. It showed that the 
manufacturing sector received absence or low degree of direct support from the government. 
Column 1 Column 2 1 Column 3 | Column 4 ~~~I Column 5 
FAVOURABLE TO FAVOURABLE TO FAVOURABLE TO FAVOURABLE TO ABSENCE OR 
BRITAIN BRITISH HONGS BOTH BRITISH ALL SECTORS IN LOW DEGREE OF 
HONGS & LOCAL HK SUPPORT 
INDUSTRIALISTS 
-MONETARY/ -GRANTING -TRADE -HOUSING -RESEARCH & 
FISCAL POLICY PUBLIC WORKS PROMOTION POLICY, DEVELOPMENT, 
CONTRACTS, POLICY -LAND & INFRA- -PRODUCTIVITY 
PUBLIC UTILITIES STRUCTURE, & QUALITY 
FRANCHISES, DEVELOPMENT, SUPPORT 
-FOOD PRICES SERVICES, 
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4.2. MONETARY/FISCAL POLICY WITH COLONIAL BIAS 
The HK colonial government did not use its reserve in upgrading the local 
industries if its need on the capital (to rescue Britain fs monetary crisis) was more urgent. 
Under the colonial system, Britian had a prior claim to HK's resources. This can be 
illustrated by the case of Sterling devaluation crisis in 1967. There were two mechanisms that 
"automatically transfer" HK's reserve to Britain. The first one was the legal requirement for 
fUll foreign exchange backing for each HK dollar issued, and also by law, the foreign 
exchange backing had to be 100% ^ 'sterling. And secondly, the HK government was legally 
obliged to put its budget surplus, again, under Sterling in Britain. Over time, the budget 
surplus and foreign exchange reserves accumulated, and by the time ofthe Sterling crisis took 
place in 1967, it reached a marvelous 350 million pound which was about one-third of 
Britain 's total reserves. The astonishing size of this reserves ofHK alone indicated that it 
was accumulated by the colonial government with the deliberate efforts and awareness of 
its significance to the stability ofthe British economy. *5 
It was strange that year after year the Financial Secretary budgets for a deficit; year 
after year he produced a large surplus and not demanded that more revenue had to be put back 
into the HK society. In the financial year 1967-68, the year that the Sterling crisis took place, 
actual surplus as a percentage of total revenue was 7%. By 1969-70, the percentage jumped 
to 18%. It was obvious that the amount of the colonial government surplus closely followed 
the need of Britain. *6 
Strictly speaking, the reserves were still norminally owned by the HK government and 
they earned interests on investing in securities and other financial instruments in London. But 
Far Eastern Economic Review, 9 Apr. 1964; 12 Nov. 1964; 10 Oct. 1966. 
30 Nov. 1967; 4 Apr. 1968; 
6 Ibid. ^ 
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it did not imply that Britain had not derived benefits or had no control over it. In the first 
place，HK government was prevented from taking back those capital away from London even 
when the Sterling was unstable. Moreover, HK was required to put the reserves in London 
rather than in HK and it meant that HK's capital was on loan to Britain and could not be put 
into the colony's own use. *7 In other words, Britain took HK,s colonial status to force a 
developing economy to extend a loan to a developed economy. This reserve system was an 
imposition on HK of an unpleasant task of supporting the Sterling, and such task was a 
damaging drain on funds which HK could make fruitful domestic use, such as setting an 
). �‘j 
industrial development fund. This Sterling storm costed Hong Kong to lose a total of 
HK$450 million in current price ！ *8 
The HK government had practiced tight fiscal policy, however, it would be naive to 
explain this policy in terms of the ideology of the financial secretary (the so-called fiscal 
conservatism). From the discussion above, we can see that tremendous benefits/interests had 
been reaped by UK in keeping the HK government lean and mean. By referring to the 
colonial logic and the weakness of British economy can help us to understand the linkage 
between the colony's fiscal policy and the transfer of capital from HK to UK. *9 
Comparing with other Asian NICs (such as Singapore, South Korea, etc.)，their 
governments used their reserves in contributing to improve their industries (e.g‘ in research 
7 • ‘ “ — 
T,B. Lin, 1970，"A theoretical Assessment of the Currency System of Hong Kong", 
New Asia College Academic Annual, vol. 12, 179-194. (in Chinese). 
: Far Eastern Economic Review, 2 May 1968; 6 June 1968. 
9 The ^  government not only protected UK's interests but also the interests of British 
banks in HK. In the Sterling crisis episode, the HK dollar initially followed Sterling for a full 
14% devaluation. After 4 days, the HK government revaluation the dollar by 10%, giving an 
effective devaluation of 5.7%. Most incredibly, the colonial government compensated in full 
the loss incurred by the British commercial banks in HK on their Sterling reserves by using 
the Exchange Fund of the colony. This compensation together with the loss of the Exchange 
Fund in London costed the HK people a total ofHK$450 million in current price. {HK 
Annual report, 1968, HK Government Printer, 46-47) 
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and development, technical training of manpower, loans for manufacturers, industrial estates) 
and infrastructure. The HK government was very stringent in arranging capital in this way. 
The colonial bias of its monetary/fiscal policy was obviously one of the explanations. 
4.3. HOUSING POLICY 
Before 1946，HK's populatiori was below one million. It increased to about 2.6 million 
in 1956，and was about 3.7 million in 1966. The ongoing storms of refugees rushed from 
China gave HK a heavy pressure on resources support, including housing. *10 Throughout 
the period of the 1950s to 60s, blue-collar families in HK usually spent more than 10% of 
their total expenditure on housing services. During the same period, government intervention 
in the housing market was increasing. It took two forms: increasing provision of public 
housing and rent controls. Rent control initially related solely to pre-war premises, but with 
the Rent Increases (Domestic Premises) Control Ordinance of 1963，they spread to 
encompass post-war domestic premises as well. Therefore, under this control, rents remained 
far below fair market rents. *n 
After the Shek Kip Mei fire in 1953，HK government paid great effort in providing 
public housing for the working class people. In 1954-61, the government provided about 
8523 housing units per year (they included the resettlement estates, and construction managed 
by former Housing Authority). In 1962-69, there were about 27522 public housing units built 
per year. The pace of construction was accelerated tremendously when comparing the two 
10 Hong Kong Annual Reports, various years, HK Government Printer. 
!' M. Castels，L.Goh，& R. Kwok, 1990，Shek Kip Mei Syndrome, Pion Ltd., London, 
chaps. 1-2. The rent control policy was cancelled in the Spring of 1997. 
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periods. *12 The commitment of the government on providing public housing as a kind of 
social wage was harmonic with the political theme of the colonial state. The theme was clear: 
the city-state with the capitalist in nature had to suppress the labour cost on the one hand, and 
maintained the social/political stability on the other. The crowd of lower class with the poor 
living condition (such as in the squatter area) would be "very dangerous" for leading to 
crimes and even riots. The policy of public housing was surely mixed with strong political 
implication in that period of time. *13 
y 
j i； 
4.4. INVESTMENT & TRADE PROMOTION 
By the end of the 1950s when HK was celebrating the success of industrialization, 
signs of industrial crises had begun to surface. Britain imposed its restriction on HK textiles 
exports by the 1959 Lancashire Pact, and since then protectionism had become a serious 
menace to the export-oriented industrial structure in HK. Britain's attempt to enter the 
European Community in the 1960s created another serious threat to HK's industries because it 
meant the termination of the Imperial Preference System which had given HK goods tariff 
concessions when entering the British market. * 丨4 Face with these problems, the HK colonial 
M. Castells, L.Goh, & R. Kwok，1990，chaps. 1-2. 
[Mr. Wong, Sien-bing, legislator] "I think most Members would agree that if there is 
any single program which has a direct bearing on stabilizing the livelihood of the people, it is 
low-cost housing,.... housing is the logical choice for Government action...... Hong Kong is 
already very advanced in public housing in that approximately 40% of the population is 
housed in Government or Government-aided accommodation,.... the original concept of 
housing people to fixed permanent accommodation at about 15% of their income should 
continue to be the guide as far as low-cost housing for the blue and white collar groups are 
concerned." HK hansard, Oct. 1970，p.36. ‘ 
Far Eastern Economic Review, 18 Oct. 1962. 
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government did nothing in negotiation with the British Cabinet nor did it take other means to 
improve the situations. *15 
Nevertheless, the HK government's exceptionally active approach in trade promotion 
should be viewed not only as an attempt to expand industrial production (and then its 
revenue), but also as a way to deflect HK people's anger over British protectionism, and to 
directly cater to the interests of the British hongs and commercial sector which had been 
marketing a large portion of the industrial products overseas. To encourage overseas 
investment, the Industry and Tradd Department made an active effort in publicising HK as 
a favourable offshore manufacturing location started from the mid of 1960s. In 1969, HK 
government participated in the World Exposition at Osaka in Japan, with an investment of 
some HK$8.6 million which it hoped to bring long-term returns in general goodwill and 
interest on HK's productions and trade. *16 
It also participated in (i) those areas where firms were unable to act individually (such as in 
international trade negotiations in GATT, MFN, etc.), *17 (ii) gathering information on 
world markets, 
15 Alex Choi，1994, "Beyond Market and State : A Study of Hong Kong's Industrial 
Transformation", Studies in Political Economy, 45: 28-64. 
16 HK Hansard, Oct. 1970，p.5. 
The government paid even greater effort in the 1970s to 90s. In 1981, the Hong 
Kong-Japan Business Cooperation Committee was set up by the HK government to promote 
the trade with Japan. The Industry Department set up the One-Stop Unit in 1982, which is 
responsible for most of the foreign direct investment promotion work -- (i) provides 
introductions for overseas investors interested in establishing manufacturing operations in 
HK’ including joint ventures, subcontracting, or licensing arrangements; (ii) organises 
missions to advanced countries to seek sellers of new technologies or improved methods; 
(Hi) provides comprehensive information such as searching for potential business venture 
partners, suitable labour and industrial accommodation for prospective investors on the 
establishment of factory operations in HK For promoting foreign direct investments, under 
the Industry Department, the Promotion Consultancy Division set up (in 1982-85) five 
overseas investment promotion offices in Tokyo, London, Brussels, San Francisco, and New 
York. See, Yin-Ping Ho, 1992, 217-218. and Teresa, Y.C. Wong, 1991，256-296. 
17 K.Y. YeunS' 1991，"Role of the Hong Kong Government in Industrial Development", 
Industrial and Trade Development in Hong Kong, Centre of Asian Studies, University of 
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(iii) making representations, engaging lobbying to further trade relations with major 
importing nations, such as the US, (iv) conducing negotiations, especially relating to textiles 
and clothing. *18 
Although the government did few support (especially on financing or subsidizing) the 
manufacturing development, it made another way such as exploring the foreign markets for 
the export-oriented industries in HK. This way of help was beneficial for both of the 
manufacturing and commercial/financial sectors. 
f 
>, 
4.5. LAND AND INFRASTRUCTURE DEVELOPMENT 
Infrastructural development was one of the prominent achievements of the colonial 
government. Reservoirs construction programs (more active since the early 1960s), such as 
the Plover Cove Reservoir, helped to solve the serious water shortage problem which not 
only seriously affected people's daily live, but also posed a major bottleneck on the expansion 
of the high water consuming textiles industry. *19 Resettlement plan (started from the 1950s) 
has carried out with strong industrial consideration. This project was an effort to recombine 
labour and capital in less expensive new towns like Kwun Tong and Tsuen Wan.*20 
Expansion project of the Kai Tak airport in the 1960s was also favourable to the trade and 
industrial development in HK.*21 Construction of the cross-harbour tunnel and the complex 
HK Press, 48-56. 
18 K.Y. Yeung, 1991,48-56. 
Far Eastern Economic Review, 16-May 1963. 
Roger Bristow, 1989，Hong Kong's New Town : A Selective Review, HK: Oxford U 
Press, 72. 
^ Tlie resettlement, reservoir construction and expansion of airport were hailed as a 




of roads and flyovers associated with it was started in the late 1960s (and it was very essential 
to breadthrough the water barrier between HK Island and Kowloon). *22 
In the land market, HK government controls the supply of land directly as owner and 
indirectly through land reclamation and broad land use/redevelopment stipulations in leases. 
The capital and recurrent revenue from land and property together have accounted for a 
considerable proportion of the total government revenue, especially in periods of property 
boom. *23 According to C.L. Wu, the government has taken a high land price policy, that 
is，the quantity of land (both for industrial and other uses) supplied by the government has 
been unduly low in slack periods (such as when the Heng Seng Indexes were low), and with 
substantial increases of land supply during boom years. *24 
Before 1973, the government sold land to industrialists at the current market price and 
through public auctions. This allocation method at that time did not favour the small or 
medium size factory owners. *25 Hence, industrial land was expensive that land cost 
represented a larger and larger item in total production cost. Fortunately the government 
provided flatted industrial units for certain small industries since the 1950s (together with the 
23 HK Hansard, Oct. 1970，p.6. — 
RECURRENT & CAPITAL REVENUE FROM LAND & PROPERTY AS % OF TOTAL GOVERNMENT 
REVENUE (BUT NOT INCLUDED REVENUE FROM TAX ON THE PROFITS OF REAL ESTATE DEVELOPERS) 
1947-48 — 15.1% 
1950-51 — 16.9% 
1954-55 — 19.2% 
1959-60 — 22.6% 
1962-63 — 33.9% 
1964-65 — 27.3% 
1969-70 — 23.1% 
1980-81 — 44.8% 
Ching-Lun Wu, 1983，A High Land Price Policy in HK: A Preliminary Study，Discussion 
Paper, no. 19，Dept. of Economics, HKU., 1-30. 
24 Ching-Lun Wu, 1983，1-30. 
Stephen Chiu, 1994，Politics of Laissez-faire, Occasional Paper no.40, HK Institute of 
Asia-Pacific Studies, Chinese University ofHK, 69-75. 
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resettlement scheme of squatters). *26 In 1963，the government allowed (in some occasions) 
industrial land to be paid by installment over a 20 years period at 5% interest rate. *27 
But these concessions were limited, and the government had basically not deviated from the 
principle of charging market rate for industrial land. Since land was one important resource 
directly controlled by the colonial government, and revenue from land sale was a major 
portion of government income as I have mentioned earlier. The commercial and financial 
capitalists also objected the idea of concessionary industrial land price because the lost of 
government revenue might mean higher tax rate on them.*28 Moreover, concessionary land 
might also threaten the bankers' mortgage business because financing land purchase had 
become a very profitable business. Some suspected that the banks had been encouraging the 
speculation of industrial land. *29 
In the 1970s，the collective power of the industrialists was accumulated to a sizable 
level, and the colonial government could not neglect their voices. The new land policy 
(started from 1973) provided areas of land for sale at concessional prices on a restricted-user 
basis. It was confined to technology-and skill-intensive industries and to industries that could 
be beneficial to the economy's industrial development. *30 The government policy of 
industrial dispersal (to the New Teiritories) distorted both land and labour markets (the latter 
— ~“ 
D.J. Dwyer and Chuen-Yan Lai, 1967，Smal Industrial Unit in Hong Kong: 
Patterns and Policies, University of Hull Publications, chaps. 1-2. '， 
HK Annual Report, 1963, 13. 
Far Eastern Economic Review, 11 August 1963. 
28 Stephen Chiu, 1994， ‘ 
Far Eastern Economic Review, 30 July 1964. 
30 As a continuation of the new land policy, the Hong Kong Industrial Estates 
Corporation was established in 1977 to develop and manage industrial estates. It sells land at 
concessional prices to high technology industries which cannot operate in multi-storey 
factory buildings. Since 1977, the government has developed several industrial estates (such 
as m Tai Po, Yuen Long, Fo Tan, and Siu Lek Yuen) for light and high technology industries 
See，Teresa, Y.C. Wong, 191，丨丨 Comparative Study ofthe Industrial Policy of HK and 
Singapore in the 1980s”，Industrial and Trade Development in Hong Kong, Centre of Asian 
Studies, University of HK Press, 256-296. 
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through the siting of public housing projects), and its provision of infrastructure and 
stipulations for special land sales to certain types of industrial users lowered production costs 
through cheaper land costs and more effective inter-industry linkages. *31 
4.6. INFLUENCES ON THE PRICES AND SUPPLIES OF 
FOODSTUFFS 
The supplies of foodstuffs are always strategic-essential for a political regime. Since 
r 
1950s, the HK government had appointed a limited number of importing firms to negotiate 
with PRC monopoly foreign trade organizations over eventual wholesale import prices. Thus, 
wholesale prices for up to 25% less of the expenditure of a blue-collar employee were 
strongly influenced by non-market forces. *32 
The government always concerns with ensuring an adequate supply of transport and 
communication facilities, electricity, fuels and other raw materials, financial and other 
business services in HK. See, Jonathan R. Schiffer, 1991, 180-196. And, Edward K Y 
Chen，& Kui-Wai Li, 1991，"Industry Development and Industrial Policy in HK" Industrial 
and Trade Development in Hong Kong, Centre of Asian Studies, University ofHK Press, 
3-47. 
32 On the issue of keeping the food cost low, China had provided a helping hand to HK 
smce the 1950s. China had the need for foreign exchanges, and the restructuring of trade 
relations to the West after the Sino-Soviet dispute, China consistently supplied food and basic 
fonsumer goods for HK at a below world market price. Together with a rising world price 
7 e l s for HK'S mdustnal exPorts due to the general inflationary tendency of world markets in 
the 1960s，the stable food and input from China enabled the HK industrialists to earn a large 
profit. China kept the production cost low in HK by indirect subsidization. Comparing with 
the world market price level in that period of time，China's net discount benefit to HK people 
f00dstuffs was about 50%, on raw materials for production was about 30%, on clothes and 
basic consumer g00ds was about 25%. These advantages led to flattening of inflation rate 
and reduction of costs of production in HK. 
Jonathan, R. Schiffer, "State Policy and Economic Growth: A Note on the Hong Kong 
Model"，International Journal of Urban & Regional Research, 15, no.2, (1991)，180-196 
And also see, Far Eastern Economic Review, 9 Nov. 1964; 10 Aug. 1967； 14 sJpt. 1967. 
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RICE CONTROL SCHEME 
Since 1955, the HK government had instituted the "Rice Control Scheme" in several 
occasions. The basic objective was to maintain a plentiful supply of rice to consumers at 
reasonably stable prices. The essence of the scheme was based on strict govenmental 
regulation and supervision of "stockholders" in such a manner as to ensure ample stocks and 
to prevent speculative activities through contrived shortages which would boost prices. *33 
ORGANIZATION AND DISTRIBUTION OF VEGETABLES AND FISH 
In local vegetable and fish production, the government has initiated, nurtured (with 
loans and grants), regulated and, at times, administered through wholesale cooperative 
marketing organisations. The involvement of government makes the supply of fish and 
vegetable corresponds with the rapidly expanding population. *34 
4.7. PRODUCTIVITY AND QUALITY SUPPORT SERVICES 
The government's institutional support on promoting productivity has not been in 
full-strength until the 1980s. It simply has made annual grants to the HK Productivity 
Council (HKPC) to maintain a range of productivity enhancement services since 1967 (but 
these services were with low popularity among the local industrialists, especially those of the 
small firms) *35 These took the forms of laboratory facilities, bureau services and a variety 
33 Jonathan, R. Schiffer, (1991)，180-196. 
34 Jonathan, R. Schiffer, (1991), 180-196. 
The effectiveness of the Productivity Council was cast in doubt by a study of small 
and medium industries in Kwun Tong in the late 1970s，more than a decade after it was 
established. Out of a sample of 30 firms, 13 had not even heard of it. Another 11 had heard of 
it，but had little impression of it, nor did they take its services. See, Victor Mok, 1981, 
"Small Factories in Kwun Tong : Problems of Strategies for Development", in Ambrose King 
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of consultancies. The areas of support included such as electronics, metalwork, textiles & 
apparel, plastics, etc.*36 
The early 1980s can be taken as a watershed in which the government started to 
promote and put more institutional (not ad hoc) efforts towards the manufacturing (especially 
those with high techology / high value-added industries). By comparison, in the 1950s and 
60s, there was few institutional device with the same nature. Moreover, the Industry 
Development Board (as a statutory body) takes up a more active and flexible role (than the 
Industry Department) as an institutional support to upgrade the productivity of HK's 
manufacturing. 
4.8. INADEQUATE RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT 
POLICY 
The government had no long-term plan on promoting the research and development 
relating with industries until the 1980s. It initiated the advisory committee report on 
diversification of industries (in 1979) which promoted the diversification of markets and 
products of local industries. However, the work of this committee was simply making 
suggestions to the manufacturing firms to diversify the outputs markets and kinds of 
products. The committee rarely suggested what could the government do to help. *37 
and Ranee Lee, eds, Social Life and Development in Hong Kong, HK: Chinese U. Press 
360-386. 
Since 1980, the Hong Kong Productivity Council has widened its scope of operation 
to provide a range of industrial information support (which encouraged joint-ventures 
between foreign and local entrepreneurs) and technical back-up services to industries. It also 
provides specialised training courses for the industrialists, managers, foremen, etc. about 
quality upgrading, exploration/introduction of new technology, current trends of foreign 
markets. See, Teresa, Y.C. Wong, 1991，256-296. And, K.Y. Yeung, 1991, "Role of the 
Hong Kong Government in Industrial Development", Industrial and Trade Development in 
Hong Kong, Centre of Asian Studies, University of HK Press, 48-56. 
R&D activities are mainly left in the hands of private enterprises. Government-
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4.9. ABSENCE OF INDUSTRIAL BANK AND FEW 
FINANCIAL INCENTIVES FOR INDUSTRIES 
The British hongs' and banks' representatives had always been dominant in the 
Executive and Legislative Councils of the colony until the late 1980s. The state/bureaucratic 
elite had their own considerations sometimes. But in many instances, the top bureaucrats 
(mostly occupied by British before the decolonization) usually preferred to take the 
suggestions/ideas of the British hongs seriously. 
There was a debate on the setting up of an industrial bank in HK in the 1950s and 
1960s. The debate process itself offered a glimpse in the conflict between the industrialists 
and the banking elite, and where the colonial government had stood. For the industrialists, 
the availability of low-interest, long-term industrial loans was a driving force for setting up an 
industrial bank, In promoting this, the industrialists argued that the bank was needed not only 
for their own interests (having the capital for buying more advanced machines and upgrading 
the production), but also for a brighter and more prosperous future of the colony as a whole 
(since a good industrial development would earn more foreign exchange and provide a lot of 
job opportunities for all). *38 
This industrial need was in collision with the bankers' interests. The ability of the 
banking elite in imposing their will on the colonial state was indicated in the composition of 
the 1959 Industrial Bank Committee (set up by the government), which included the deputy 
backed research projects (started since the 1980s) have been rather evenly across industries 
and aim to benefit the whole industrial sector. There is no strategic industry identified by the 
government. It does not support any infant industry. The development strategies are 
decentralised to individual industrialists. Since 1982, the Industry Department has 
commissioned techno-economic studies on selected industries every year. Then, selected 
industrial research projects have been funded by the Industry Development Board to promote 
industry-university cooperation. In 1984, the Industry Development Board set up a 
CAD/CAM sub-committee to monitor the development and application of the technology. 
See, Teresa Y.C. Wong, 1991，256-296. 
38 Far Eastern Economic Review, 12 Mar. 1965. 
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Financial Secretary as the chairman and five unofficials (none of them had any industrial 
background, but 3 of the unofficials were from the banking sector). The dominance of the 
committee by members from the banking guarantee! a negative recommendation, because they 
disliked the notion of setting up a public or semi-public financial institution that would 
compete with them. *39 
The industrial bank idea was then abandoned. The colonial government saw no urge 
to support the small- and medium-size manufacturing firms through financial means. It had 
few financial incentives (such as h^e tax hoilday or subsidies) to attract the industrial 
). 
investments until the 1970s. In a few occasions, the government provided loans for selected 
small industries (1972-75). However, it was stopped later, since the government officials said 
that this means was not so effective. *40 
In 1970，a legislator, Lo, Kwee-seong, suggested the government in cooperation with 
commercial banks to establish a scheme specifically for making medium term loans to small 
and medium size factories for the purpose of purchasing machinery and equipment *41. 
It could help the factories to modernize their equipment and their management techniques, 
and hence to raise the level of the industrial productivity. This recommendation was made 
after long and careful studies by the Loans for Small Industry Committee set up by the Trade 
and Industry Advisory Board (which was a non-governmental board). The proposed scheme 
was a modest one calling only for an initial capital of HKS10 million. But it was hoped that 
once proven successful, both government and private commercial banks would be willing to 
lend it their further support. K.S. Lo argued that the commercial banks usually helped the 
39 Stephen Chiu, 1994, Politics of Laissez-faire, Occasional Paper no.40, HK Institute of 
Asia-Pacific Studies, Chinese University of HK, 82-83. 
40 Teresa Y.C. Wong, 1991, "Comparative Study of the Industrial Policy of HK and 
Singapore in the 1980s", Industrial and Trade Development in Hong Kong, Centre of Asian 
Studies, University of HK Press, 256-296. 
41 HK Hansard, Oct. 1970, p.47-49. 
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large firms only. Moreover, the banks were obliged to confine to short-term loans. Hence, for 
capital investments in machinery, most small factories had to rely entirely on their own 
resources or on relatives and private money lenders. However, they were finding it more 
and more difficult to raise money privately because of two phenomena : (i) as more and more 
people had learned to trust the banks, money was then deposited with the banks instead of 
lying around the house; (ii) with more and more companies going public, spare cash had then 
found a new outlet in the stock markets. So private money was getting more and more scarce. 
The scheme as recommende4 by the Loans for Small Industry Committee had only 
). 
one objective, and that was to make medium-term loans available to small factories based on 
technical, economic and managerial criteria instead of the over emphasis on collateral 
security. And the loans would only be used for the purchase of machinery and equipment for 
modernization and expansion. Mr. Lo further argued that many countries in Asia had 
recognised the need for some sort of financial institution to assist the growth of small 
industry. In Japan, there were several institutions solely sponsored by the government, such 
as Small Business Finance Corporation and People's Finance Corporation to assist small 
industry. Singapore, Thailand and Taiwan, each had its own institute for giving loans to small 
industries. 
However, the Financial Secretary, Philip Haddon-Cave, rejected the scheme. 
"I must confess my distaste for any proposal to use public funds for the 
support of selected and thereby privileged industrialists, the more disfavour if 
this is to be used on bureaucratic views of what is good and what is bad by 
way of industrial development... Firstly, .. there is a reference in the report to 
banks and government sharing the profit and loss on guaranteed loans but the 
present proposal would allow the banks to select their worst risks for 
guarantee, automatic guarantee, while keeping all the profit on industrialists' 
better risks. In underwriting terms this is wholly unacceptable. ... Secondly,... 
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banks could not, in the nature of their bsuiness, make loans of a long enough 
duration to meet industrial needs, rather than that they were not in a position to 
accept the commercial risks involved.... I find odd the view that a government 
institution is better placed to evaluate the technical and financial viability of a 
project that a commercial bank. ... I myself tend to mistrust the judgement of 
anyone not involved in the actual process of risk-taking." *42 
The main implication of Haddon-Cave was that the colonial government did not want 
to share the risk of the industrial entrepreneurs, neither did it throw the burden to the bankers. 
The industrialists had to take up they own risks in investment with high prices. 
Hong Kong's economic governance was greatly different from those of other Asian 
v 
NICs. There were state provisions of industrial finance via a semi-statutory board such as the 
Economic Development Board in Singapore, or via a state-owned banking system in South 
Korea and Taiwan. The financial incentive was an important state intervention in 
industrialisation and economic restructuring in these Asian NICs. *43 
4.10. DEFICIENCY IN MANPOWER TRAINING FOR 
MANUFACTURING 一 
One frequent criticism of HK's manpower training policy was that the average 
technical and general educational attainments of the labourers were low comparing with the 
Asian NICs. On the basis of all industries surveyed in. the early 1970s，(i) operatives and 
general workers accounted for 75% of total employment, (ii) craftmen and technicans only 
accounted for 19% and less than 6% respectively, (iii) 96% of the employed population in the 
manufacturing sector had not acquired technical and vocational training, (iv) 89% of the 
42 HK Hansard, Oct. 1970，p.l 16-117. 
43 Stephen Chiu, 1994，Politics of Laissez-faire, Occasional Paper no.40, HK Institute of 
Asia-Pacific Studies, Chinese University of HK, 75-76. 
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employed population in tertiary sector had not acquired vocational training, (v) about 59% of 
the labour force had not received secondary education. +44 
A legislator, Chung, Sze-yuen argued that — 
"There is in the industrial infrastructure a major and vital area which Hong 
Kong has neglected and is still neglecting. It is technical education and 
industrial training for the young generation. This is an internal factor, over 
which we in Hong Kong have full control. Whilst Government has recognised 
the deficiency in technical education and a year ago appointed a Polytechnic 
Planning Committee to rectify the inadequacy at the middle level, no serious 
attempt apparently has been made to look at the overall situation more 
realistically. As a result, the portage of technicians and craftsmen is becoming 
increasingly critical and, unless there will be some significant improvement in 
the near future, our rate of industrial expansion, and hence economic growth, 
may be slowed down appreciably." (HK Hansard, Oct. 1970, p.41) 
Another legislator, Lo, Kwee-seong further argued that --
"Our labour pool has dried up, whereas ten years ago we were able to get all 
the labour we wanted, today we find ourselves short of manpower in almost 
every industry. Due to thsi shortage, wages have been going up by leaps and 
bounds,... the cost of labour could weel have more than doubled in the last six 
years. This makes our labour cost the highest in Asia, after Japan.... In order to 
increase productivity we have to ask the Government to speed up the provision 
of training facilities for craftsmen and technicians, industrial supervisors and 
middle-level managers." (HK Hansard, Oct. 1970，p.46-47.) 
Obviously, the government had not produced adquately the skilled manpower required by 
industries. In turn, it hampered the industrial upgrading, and moving to higher value-added 
production. 
44 Lin, Tzong-biau, and Ho, Yin-Ping, 1980，Export-oriented Growth and Industrial 
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As a reminder to the readers, the table (repeated from page 64) summarised the 
selective interventions of the colonial government discussed in this chapter. Not all these 
items were favourble to the economic restructuring of HK in the 1950s-60s. Only the items 
listed in column 3 and 4 in the table were favourable to the industrial taking-off. Hence, the 
colonial government only played a partial role in facilitating the economic 
restructuring. Other efforts were made by the private sectors. The government had no 
long-term or active planning for the industrialisation. Its major concern was to maintain Hong 
Kong as a free trade port, with stability and prosperity, and a good working environment for 
the British hongs. The opening up of US and European markets was a contingency for the 
good sales of HK's manufacturing products. 
The delineation in this chapter showed that the colonial government actually did not take a 
laissez-faire approach to the economic governance. The Sterling storm case showed that 
the colonial government did an unfair deal to HK people. The money of HK people (in the 
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government reserves) was not used for HK people. The colonial government was not lack 
of capital, but it did not want to spend on supporting the local industries directly. The 
most obvious reason - the major instruction from London to the colonial governor was 
to maintain the interests of Britain and its trade in Asia. 
r 
s e ). 
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CHAPTER FIVE 一 
THE DOMINANCE OF BRITISH HONGS, IN HONG KONG 
5.1. INTRODUCTION 
In Chapter Four, I have analysed the selective interventionism of economic 
governance (as a form of institutional arrangement) in HK. Evidences showed that, due to 
its colonial nature, the government had bias which favoured the interests of Britain and 
British hongs. These bias partly came from the colony's political system, and partly came 
f I 
from the colonial mind-sets of the'top decision-makers in the bureaucracy. This brand of 
selective interventionism as a kind of institutional arrangement (including informal rules and 
norms，common practices, codes of conduct, formal organisations, ..etc.), with structural 
inertia (and being reinforced by the Foreign Office in Britain, and the leaders ofthe British 
hongs in HK), could prolong for a long period of time if there was no challenge from 
dominant agents in the society. 
This chapter will further enrich the thesis that it delineates the historical foundation 
and current dominance of the British hongs. You shall find that the prosperity ofthe British 
hongs is quite closely related with the everyday lives of HK people. Although I cannot find 
out the documents to prove if there was any secret deal between the colonial bureaucracy and 
British hongs, I can get some indirect indicators which showed the significance ofthe British 
hongs in the power structure of the colony. 
The British hongs had built their business empire in HK with the blessing of the 
colonial government. Land is a rare resource in HK and the hongs owned the best locations in 
the Hong Kong Island (such as the prime areas in the Central and Causeway Bay). In the end 
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of 1960s, their business fields covered across trading services, engineering, exports of HK 
products, China trade, shipping, airways, insurance, financial secretarial and investment 
services, real estate development, warehousing, container terminals, shopping complex, 
textiles and clothing, hotel services, ferry and tram services, dairy products, wholesaling and 
retailing ..etc. The power of the British hongs was embedded in the historical root of the 
colony. 
The British taipans had always expected to have some power in the governing of the 
colony. The taipans closely scrutinised the actions of the governors (appointed from London) 
and actively criticised any measures which they perceived as against their interests. And 
sometimes the taipans wrote complaint letters directly to London (to the Parliament or 
Colonial Office). Before the end of 19th century, the taipans successfully demanded a couple 
of seats in the Legco and Exco of the colony. Taking representation in the colony's highest 
administrative bodies, the British hongs established firmly their political power in the Hong 
Kong society. In turn, the economic policies (pro-business rather than pro-industry) of the 
colonial government were heavily influenced by them. Moreover, the public utilities 
businesses and other services were mostly monopolised by the British hongs for decades or 
even a century. These franchises had brought great wealth for the hongs, and in return, their 
aggregated wealth-cum-power was so mighty that it could not be shaken or challenged by any 
other parties (until the era of decolonisation). 
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5丄 THE HISTORICAL FOUNDATION OF THE BRITISH HONGS TN 
HONG KONG AND ITS POLITICAL IMPLICATION 
The Opium War was usually taken as the immediate event that brought about the 
Treaty of Nanking in 1842, which represented a complete triumph for the British traders; five 
treaty ports in China were opened for trade; and the island of Hong Kong was ceded to 
Britain. Thus Hong Kong was perceived as a direct result of the opening of China to trade. 
The underlying cause of the Opium War was the conflict between British traders and the 
Chinese authorities, which had devql&ped over a long period of Sino-British trade. 
Hong Kong was therefore the outcome of a long crusade by British traders to promote 
trade with China obsessively. The manner in which it occurred had important implications for 
the subsequent political-economic development of HK. Firstly, the nature of the colony's 
economy was determined from the start -- it was to be an entrepot, a trading foothold in the 
mouth of China. It follows that the kind of Britons who would have the greatest stake in the 
colony were the traders (especially the hongs which enjoyed the monopolies granted by 
British authorities). Secondly, the manner of HK's acquisition - the victory in the Opium 
War - established British sovereignty firmly over the island, and naturally gave the British 
political supremacy over the native Chinese. And in general, the relations between the two 
races there would be alienated (except the cases of those Chinese merchants and middlemen 
who had the trade relations with the British). In other words, the relationship between 
members of the two races was paradoxical - politically, one of racial hostility, due to the 
very fact that Hong Kong was a colony; and economically, one of mutual dependence in the 
E.J. Eitel, (1895)，Europe in China: The History of Hong Kong from the Beginning 
to the Year 1882, reprinted in Hong KOng Oxford University Press, (1983): 44. 
code— 5mphil.sam 
p-85 
China trade in particular (and trade in Asia in general). This paradox has more or less 
maintained for one and a half of century. *2 
Since the British taipans (including the members of the Jardine & Matheson, 
Butterfield & Swire, Hong Kong and Shanghai Bank) had been a closely knit community in 
Canton before the Opium War (although they were also competing with each others), when 
they moved to Hong Kong they naturally brought with them their collective identity and 
social relations. Moreover, the administrative framework of the colony was one imposed by 
the British government and administered by British civil servants. The political order was 
> . 
therefore one with which the British merchants were familiar, and it was beneficial to them 
more than the Chinese population. *3 Without the challenge of any indigenous consolidated 
classes, the British readily assumed a dominant place in the social structure of the colony.*4 
Nevertheless, the British hongs required Chinese for their labour in the building of the 
colony. Furthermore, they needed the Chinese traders and middlemen who could bridge the 
cultural and language barrier between the merchants of the two races. Hence, the Chinese 
compradores became the important helpers to the British traders. 
The Britons in Hong Kong had formed a close community, but it did not mean that 
they had no conflicts and competition among themselves. From the beginning, the British 
taipans had been more concerned with the retention of Hong Kong than had the British 
officials, so naturally they expected to have some power or position in the governing of the 
colony. The HK government headed by a governor appointed from London and acting with 
2 E.J. Eitel, (1895), 47. And, 
Wai-Kwan Chan, 1991, Making of Hong Kong Society, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1-18. 
3 Wai-Kwan Chan, 1991, chaps. 1-2. 
4 There were five great clans in Hong Kong but they could not form a closely knit 
community. See, Hugh Baker, 1966, "The Five Great Clans of the New Territories", in 
Journal of the Hong Kong Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society, 6: 25-47. 
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the crown's authority. However, the British traders, rather than being merely subjects, had a 
self-appointed role of sanctioning and overseeing it. The taipans closely scrutinised the 
actions of the governors and actively criticised any measures which they perceived as against 
their interests. The letters of the early Jardine taipans (in the 19th and early 20th century) 
were filled with comments on the conducts of British government officials and opinions on 
how HK should be run. These comments were in an attitude as though the merchants had a 
bigger share in the governing of HK than the governors. *5 
Since the mid of 19th century，the British merchants had presented a lot of complaints 
to London (especially to the Secretary of State for the Colonies). They criticised for the 
governors’ policies and requested for some form of municipal self-government. Although 
their intention had been mainly to protect their own interests (such as for lower tax rate in 
HK) rather than to press for self-government as a matter of principle *6, they did succeed to 
draw the attention of the Parliament, which in 1947 appointed a Select Committee on China 
Trade to investigate the matter. The committee was sympathetic towards the merchants and 
recommended that a share in the administration of the ordinaiy and domestic affairs of the 
colony should be given, by some system of municipal government, to the British residents in 
HK. *? In 1850，first two British merchants were appointed to the Legislative Council as the 
unofficial members. One of them was the Jardine taipan. Since then, the British merchants 
(especially the Jardine as the key leading hong) got themselves firmly planted in positions of 
power in the small colony.*8 Thereafter, the number of unofficials in the Legislative Council 
5 Wai-Kwan Chan, (1991), 25-27. 
G.B. Endacott, 1956, "Proposals for Municipal Government in Early Hong Kong", 
Journal of Oriental Studies, Hong Kong : HK Univeristy Press, 75-82. 
Endacott, 1964 a, Government and People in Hong Kong 1841-1964; A 
Constitutional History, Hong Kong : HK University Press, 44-50. 
Endacott, 1964 a, Government and People in Hong Kong 1841-1964; A 
Constitutional History, Hong Kong : HK University Press, 110- 120. 
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was gradually increased. In 1960 there were nine unofficial members as against nine officials 
(excluding the governor). Until the late 1980s, the Jardine，Matheson & Co.，Hongkong & 
Shanghai Banking Corporation, the Swire Ltd., China Light & Power Co. Ltd. each had 
often, if not always, arranged a director sitting in the Legco.*9 All the successive governors 
did not violate the "custom" for providing the positions of power to the great British hongs. 
The unofficial members of the Legislative Council became part of the political establishment, 
exerting their influence directly in making law and deciding government policies. The power 
matrix became more complicated by the rise of the Chinese merchant class, who took their 
first unofficial seat on the Legco in 1880.*10 
In order to further their political power, the British taipans managed to have the 
Executive Council (Exco) - the equivalent of the governor's cabinet 一 expanded to 
incorporate British unofficial members. In 1896 two merchants were appointed to the Exco, 
Jardine's JJ. Bell-Irving being one of them. Taking representation in the colony's highest 
administrative bodies, the British hongs established firmly their political power in Hong 
Kong society. *n 
No doubt, the British hongs were powerful in both economic and political dimensions. 
After the colonialization of Hong Kong, the Britons and other Europeans consolidated their 
business networks in Hong Kong and Canton rapidly. The foreign residents in HK took a 
variety of occupations. Besides the merchant houses and their employees, there were 
shipbuilders, lawyers, auctioneers, newspaper editors and storekeepers. They offered 
supporting services to the trading hongs by providing ships, legal services, information, or 
Official Report to Proceedings, Hong Kong Legislative Council, 1947 - 1990, 
various years. 
10 Wai-Kwan Chan, 1991’ chap. 2. 
11 John Rear, 1971，"One Brand of Politics"，m Hong Kong: The Industrial Colony, ed. 
by Keith Hopkins, Hong Kong : Oxford University Press, 55-140. 
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go-down (storage services). The other professions of the foreigners also included architects, 
civil engineers, technicians, doctors, tailors, teachers, etc. In the small colony, the foreigners 
were tied together by business relations among themselves. The local agency services of the 
great British hongs (such as the Jardine's) were an important mechanism for binding the 
Europeans together in HK. Besides doing the China trade, the British hongs also were in the 
business of fund management for their employees and friends (such as making loans on 
mortgage). The hongs were acting in the role of bankers. They also built houses for rent. 
There were many properties under the hongs' management Since the mid of 19th century, the 
Hongs were the early developers in the local real estate market (especially in the Central 
District，or the Victoria City as the old name). This business ensured a wide range of 
connections within the local community. *12 
Doing business was also a means by which the taipans maintained connections with 
the colonial government officials. Until the early 20th century, colonial government officials 
were allowed to engage in private business, and many civil servants were at the same time 
successful businessmen. *13 Moreover, intimate friendship developed between the taipans 
and some senior government officials (and even the governors). Documentary evidences 
show that they had exchanges of interests. *14 
The British hongs such as Jardine had put much effort in building relationships with 
the colonial government as well as other traders. James Matheson had supported the idea of 
organising a Chamber of Commerce. In 1861, the Hong Kong General Chamber of 
Commerce was formed by 62 firms in the colony to represent the merchants' collective 
interests, with Alexander Perceval of Jardines as the Chamber's first chairman. Later, 
12 John Luff，1962, Hong Kong Story, Hong Kong: South China Morning Post Ltd., 
20-30. 
13 John Luff, 1962, 20-30. 
14 Wai-Kwan Chan, 1991, 28-31. 
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Jardines' William Keswick was made chairman in 1869. *15 In the four decades from 1861 
to 1900，Jardines' taipans had been either chairman or vice-chairman of the Chamber 20 
times.*16 
Besides the General Chamber of Commerce, the board room of the Hongkong and 
Shanghai Banking Corporation (HSBC) was another arena in which the taipans of various 
hongs got together. The HSBC was the most important financial institution and it had 19 
companies represented in its Board of Directors before the 20th century. *17 Amongst them, 
Jardine was consistently represented^  from 1877 onwards when Keswick was first elected to 
the board. In the 25 years from 1877 to 1902，Jardines' taipans had been chairman or 
vice-chairman eight times in this most powerful bank in the Far East. *18 Besides business 
relations, the social network created by these associations have been enormous. 
In sum, the British hongs played an important part in the acquisition and retention of 
Hong Kong as a British colony. They took advantage of the British governmental system 
imposed on Hong Kong and established themselves firmly in the political decision-making 
process through representation in the Legislative Council and Executive Council. The 
economic opportunities as well as municipal affairs of the colony created new social and 
business networks. Social clubs and interest groups, such as the Hong Kong Club, were 
created and became centres of social activities for the foreign community. Within these social 
environment, the colonial government officials and British traders had intimate relations. In 
most occasions, they realised that their common interests were more than conflicts. 
Wilfred V. Pennell, 1961, History of the Hong Kong General Chamber of 
Commerce，1861-1961, Hong Kong: Cathay Press. 18. 
Wilfred V. Pennell, 1961, History of the Hong Kong General Chamber of 
Commerce, 1861-1961, Hong Kong: Cathay Press. 70. 
17 Frank King, 1987, Hong Kong Bank in Late Imperial China 1864-1902, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 462. 
18 Frank King, 1987, 361-366，408-409，462-468. 
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5.3. DOMINANCE OF THE BRITISH HONGS IN HONG KONG IN 
THE PERIOD OF 1950-70 
From the previous section, we find that the power of the British hongs had rooted in 
the colonial system from the beginning. Their main aim was oriented towards trading and 
making money. But this was not the whole story. The competition for social status and desire 
for power and autonomy of the taipans were developing as long as they stayed in the small 
colony over time. Many middle class Europeans experienced status elevation when they took 
up a job in the East. *19 Members of the hongs developed a "sense of belonging" in the 
* 
). 
colony when they worked in here for several decades. Except in the period of wars and 
unstability, the directors of the British hongs had contributed great effort in promoting the 
improvement of infrastructure and business environment of the colony. They had occupied 
seats in the Legco and Exco over a century, and they had made significant influences on the 
government policies in both economic and political dimensions. 
In the appendix ( Sheet 1 ) we find that the socio-economic backgrounds of the Exco 
and/or Legco members are quite homogeneous (especially in the 1950s and early 1960s). 
Most of them were the directors of British hongs (or their branch companies) such as the 
Jardine Matheson, Hongkong & Shanghai Bank, Hutchinson, China Light & Power， 
Kowloon Wharf & Godown, Hong Kong Land, Butterfield & Swire, etc. 
However, towards the end of 1960s, more and more Chinese capitalists were 
appointed as unofficial members in the two Councils. Most of them were bankers (such as 
those from the Hang Seng Bank, Bank of East Asia). And a few Chinese capitalists with 
manufacturing background also took the seats after the mid of 1960s (such as those related 
with Mayfair Industries Ltd., HK Textile Mills Association, HK Cotton Merchants 
19 Wai-Kwan Chan, 1991, 47-49. 
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Association, HK Soya Bean Products Co., Winsor Industrial Co., Li & Fung Ltd., etc.). 
Nevertheless, the British taipans still had louder voices in the two Councils. 
After the two world wars, the British hongs realised that they had to keep a closer 
relationship with the local Chinese merchants. Britain could no longer provide powerful 
protection for the hongs as the conditions before the wars. On the one hand, the hongs had to 
diversify their businesses over Asia, and on the other hand, the taipans needed to cooperate 
with the local Chinese bankers and merchants since they had more information about the 
China market and better business relationship with the other Asian merchants in the region. 
The strategic consideration of the British hongs (those clustered around the 
commercial and financial fields) were with the following strings — 
(i) Keeping an intimate capital-state linkage (which had developed prior to the industrial 
taking-off in HK) was essential. Members ofthe large expatriate-British hongs (such as the 
HK & Shanghai Bank, Jardine Matheson, Butterfield & Swire) were co-opted into the 
colonial power structure through the appointment system (of unofficial memberships) to the 
Executive and/or Legislative Councils. *20 
(ii) It is profitable in intensifying investments in HK both vertically and horizontally. The 
businesses of the hongs in HK covered many aspects (they will be discussed in the coming 
section). Since the hongs had close relationships with the colonial government, they easily 
earned the monopolies of businesses in various fields (especially in public utilities). The 
British hongs got the maximum profits through both economies of scale and scope. In return, 
since they controlled so many public utilities, they had larger voices in affecting the 
government policies and living standards of HK people. 
20 S.N.G. Davies, 1977，"One Brand of Politics Rekindled", HK Law Journal, 7(1): 
44-84.. 
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(iii) After building so many fixed assets (such as hotels, transport services, real estates) and 
business networks in HK, the British hongs became more and more accepting that "HK is our 
home with prosperity". Together with the political lessons from the 1966-67 riots and the 
MacLehose's reforms. The British hongs learnt that HK was a "boat" for both the HK Chinese 
and the expatriate merchants to live on. The hongs had to keep the "boat" to be well-eqipped. 
The living standards (as well as the consumption power) of the HK people had to be uplifted. 
Their general education level had to be raised. After fulfilling all these, the competitiveness 
of HK could be upgraded, and hence； the growth rates of profits of the British hongs could be 
ensured. 
For about 20 years' intensive investment deepening after the Second World War, 
Jardine Matheson (as a conglomerate) became the second largest employer in HK (the first 
one is the government). There was a close relationship between the prosperity of HK and the 
thriving of the conglomerate. As a case illustration, in the following, I shall show the scope of 
business of this great British hong in the small colony. 
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5.4. THE BUSINESS ACTIVITIES OF THE JARDINE. MATHESON & 
CO. LTD. IN HONG KONG *21 
(i). Trading Services — 
Jardine managed import and export trades in Asia for all kinds of both durable and 
expendable consumer goods. The items included whisky from Scotland; cognac from France; 
camera from Japan; radios and tape recorders from Germany; textiles from Britain; watches 
and cosmetics from the US A,..etc. The company also managed the marketing, wholesaling 
and retailing. ^ \ 
(ii). Exports of Hong Kong Products — 
Jardine helped exporting the manufactured goods ofHK to foreign markets (including 
the USA, Europe and S.E. Asian nations). The goods included garments, footwear, gloves, 
finished and unfinished textiles, electrical goods, plastic products, metalware, furniture, toys, 
(iii>. Engineering 一 
The Jardine Engineering Corporation Ltd. worked for importing, installing, 
maintaining and servicing to all types of light and heavy machinery. It also supplied most 
kinds of constructional materials, together with technical and specialist equipments such as 
the structural steel, lifts, air conditioning plants for buildings; machinery for factories, power 
21 Jardine, Matheson & Co., I960, Jardine, Matheson & Company •• An Historical 
Sketch, 31-64. 
Jardine, Matheson & Co” 1965, Jardines Today: A Short Account of the Services 
and Facilities. 1-38. 
Jardine, Matheson & Co.，1970，Annual Report, 2-20. 
Jardine, Matheson & Co.，1971, A Better Way of Doing Business Throughout Asia 
and the Pacific, 1-12. 
Vickers, da Costa & Co. (London), Research Department, 1973，Hong Kong 
Merchant Traders: A Reappraisal — Jardine，Matheson & Co. Ltd” 7-19. 
Jardine, Matheson & Co.，1973，Annual Report, 2-27. 
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station generators, lighting installation for business premises, complete telephone exchanges, 
security equipment for bank vaults, strong rooms and safe deposits, filtration and water 
treatment plant; equipment for railways, aircraft, land reclamation, reservoir construction..etc. 
(iv). Trade with China — 
Jardines' staff had long-standing connections with the Chinese Government Trading 
Corporations (the sole buying and selling agencies) and with their official agent in HK, the 
China Resources Company. Senior staff of Jardines regularly visited the various trade fairs in 
Peking and other districts. It developed China's requirements - among them, fertilisers and 
tractors for agriculture, dyestuffs for textiles，machinery, trucks, aircraft 一 into orders for 
manufacturers in UK or elsewhere. Jardines also managed the imports from China included 
tea, textiles, wool, furs, soya beans, edible oils,…etc. 
(v) Shipping _ 
Jardines' shipping services covered operation, chartering, management and agency. 
They engaged on many specialised cargo services across several key localities such as Japan, 
Indonesia (Calcutta), Hong Kong, Malaysia (Sabah), Singapore, Burma, East Pakistan, 
Thailand (Bangkok), Australia (Sydney), Philippines, China, ..etc. 
Jardines (as shipping agency) also represented various leading liner and tramp shipping lines 
such as the Glen Line Ltd. providing a regular fast cargo services from the Far East to the UK 
and Europe. Jardines frequently performed technical services for companies associated with 
or represented by the firm. 
(vi) Airways— 
A comprehensive service is provided by Jardines in HK for air lines, passengers and 
shippers. Jardine Airways (JA) was set up in 1946 to act as B.O.A.C. general agents for HK 
and China. Later, as the JA expanded, it obtained the General Sales Agency for Qantas, 
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Trans-Australian Airlines and Air Canada. Then JA became an approved I.A.T.A. Agent, 
selling on behalf of all airlines world wide. JA was a fully fledged travel agency. Jardines 
also operated traffic handling and operations and air cargo units based at Kai Tak Airport (or 
called HK International Airport later) which deal with almost 50% of the airport's total traffic. 
Moreover, Jardines' HK Air Terminal Services Ltd. required by the HK government for a 
single company provided a centralised passenger, baggage and freight handling system for all 
airlines using HK airport. 
(vii) Insurance — > 
Jardines' Lombard Insurance Company Ltd. was a Founder Member of the Institute of 
London Underwriters, originated from an Underwriting Society founded in 1804 by the early 
traders in Canton. The company later became the Society's manager and in 1836 changed its 
Constitution making it the Canton Insurance Office. The latter was reorganised later under the 
Companies Ordinance, incorporated in HK. In addition, the HK Fire Insurance Co.Ltd. (as a 
subsidiary of Lombard Insurance Co.) founded in 1866 for the purpose shown by its name. 
(viii) Financial Services — 
Jardines provided investment management and financial advisory services in the 
Asian and Pacific markets. It kept pace with the emergence of HK as an off-shore investment 
and international financial centre. It acted as secretaries and/or registrars for a large number 
of public and private companies, and was actively engaged in company formation and the 
handling of share registers. Jardine Fleming & Co.Ltd., a joint venture with Robert Fleming 
& Co. Ltd. of London, specialised in institutional investment management, underwriting and 
corporate financial advice. The company provided portfolio management services for several 
Jardines institutional investment funds, for the public-quoted HK & Far Eastern Investment 
Co.Ltd. (composed almost entirely of HK stocks in 1971) and for International Pacific 
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Securities Co. Ltd., which had most of its portfolio in Japanese stocks and which had 
consistently out-performed the Tokyo Stock Exchange index, 
(ix) Other associates, subsidiaries and joint ventures 
~ Hongkong Land Investment and Agency Co. Ltd., for real estate development; 
-Hongkong & Kowloon Wharf and Godown Co.X^ ., provided dock, warehousing, and 
container terminal facilities; moreover, it owned the large shopping complex at the Ocean 
Terminal; 
-MacMillan Jardine Ltd., for the fimport and marketing of lumber, pulp, newsprint, and 
J * 
plywood throughout the Far East; 
-Telemac (HK) Ltd., for co-ordinated the manufacture and export of fashion, rainwear, 
dresses and knitwear; 
—Asia-data Ltd., for computer service bureau; 
-Alfred Dunhill (Far East) Ltd，for marketing the Dunhill products; 
-Ewo Development Ltd，Ewoland Co. Ltd” May Tower Development Ltd., Strawberry Hill 
Development Ltd., for real estates investment; 
~ Rentacolor International Ltd, for television rentals; 
—Star Ferry Co. Ltd” 
—Hongkong Tramways Ltd” 
--Mandarin Hotel，Excelsior Hotel. 
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CONCLUDING REMARKS _ 
With the blessing of the colonial government, the economies of scope and scale of the 
British hongs were very extensive and intensive respectively. To be more, the directors of the 
Biritsh hongs were part of the government. They got the rights in decision making in the 
Exco and Legco. They got the "insiders, information" about the government's 
plans/policies in advance. They had to defend their own interests in the Legco and/or Exco 
decision-making process. The governor and top bureaucrats would be pleased to let the hongs 
to "join the game" since the hongs- (with huge resources) were effective and efficient in 
building the colony up in many dimensions. On the one hand the hongs diversified their 
businesses across countries and regions, on the other hand they dreamed of taking Hong 
Kong as their own "business kingdom". 
The limitation of this chapter is that I have no access to the documents about deals between 
the hongs and the top bureaucrats since these were either not on papers or kept confidential. I 
can only argue that the scope of businesses of the British hongs (such in banking, trading， 
public works, public utilities, land properties, transportation, shipping, ..etc.) received more 
positive interventions than local industrialists from the colonial government (comparing with 
those for the manufacturing sector) and I have discussed this with a table in Chapter Four. 















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Chapter Six 一 CONCLUSION 
In this chapter, I am going to make an overall summary of the arguments of this study 
and assess the implications. 
The economic restructuring of Hong Kong •_ from an entrepot to a labour-intensive 
and export-oriented industrial city - has always been quoted as a "laissez-faire model" in 
contrast with the other three Asian Tigers with developmental statism's implication. Their 
V 
governments have much support tortile domestic industries (including direct subsidies, loans 
for industrialists with low interest rates, tax holidays; creating new industries by the state, 
exports and imports control, technological upgrading, infrastructural improvements, labour 
training ...etc). And these countries experienced industrial deepening while Hong Kong's 
industries lagged behind ( especially in the technology dimension). Signals for the need of 
industrial upgrading such as labour shortage, inadequate technical training, high land 
price/rent for factories, etc. have been flashed for several decades. But why did the Hong 
Kong government ignore all these problems ？ Why did the government not to launch 
large-scale interventions for helping the local industrialists ？ The main theme of this thesis 
is not on the study of modes of state intervention in economy, but on the political 
explanation about why did the colonial government take that particular role (form of 
economic governance) in the economy. 
I have argued that the colonial government took the approach of selective 
interventionism in protecting the interests of Britain and British hongs. The government 
provided a lot of business opportunities for the British conglomerates on the one hand, and 
the government ignored many requests from the local Chinese manufacturers on the other 
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hand. The industrialists (especially those of the small- and medium-sized firms) obtained few 
resource support to upgrade themselves towards higher-value-added working stage. In sum, 
the colonial nature of the HK government is a key factor to explain its selective 
interventionist role. 
The economic restructuring and the early industrial taking-off of HK was the outcome 
of a set of factors which including the historical contingencies (such as the civil war in 
China, Korean War); the effort of the colonial government (to maintain basic infrastructure, 
law and order, ..etc); the trading network of the British hongs (to facilitate the export-oriented 
manufacturing); the labour, capital and entrepreneurship from China. 
The colonial government maintained an institutional framework which was 
favourable to economic activities in general (and favourable to trade, commercial/financial 
sector in particular). But it kept its independence from the interest of the local industrialists 
even after they became one of the dominant economic forces in the colony. The city-state was 
in a partial-insulated form, limited political representation, and a concentrated and internally 
cohesive economic decision-making structure. The formal governmental authority was in the 
hands of civil servants (with incremental, conservative, pro-British rationale) who were 
unconstrained by any accountable electoral politics in the colony. The government had strong 
resistance to industrial requests for targeted/sectoral support. However, it did not mean that 
the government had done nothing in facilitating the economic restructuring. Actually, it 
co-operated with the British hongs in improving the local infrastructure, public utilities, 
banking and financial system, as well as the international trade networking. Furthermore, 
most of the Chinese industrialists built up a kind of "strategic symbiotic relations" with the 
hongs in business. That was why the industrialists did not invoke any "revolutionary" action 
against the colonial government. The local industrialists had its own logic of strategic 
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consideration. Many of them viewed Hong Kong as a temporary shelter. They planned for 
short- to medium-term of investments. With a certain degree of insecurity, they hesitated to 
make capital-intensive production restructuring. The entrepreneurial familism as a kind of 
mind-set further relieved the burden of the colonial government since the industrialists' 
families (or extended families) provided the "catalyst" for innovation and the support for 
risk-taking. The internal centrifugal force of the entrepreneurial family led to the evolution of 
a system of subcontracting. Such a system required the kinship, regional ties and other forms 
of networking. And this subcontrafcting system just enhanced the competitiveness and 
flexibility of Hong Kong industries in the particular international markets condition. 
At the side of the British hongs, they had another kind of strategic consideration. 
Keeping an intimate capital-state linkage was essential. Directors of the large expatriate 
British hongs were co-opted into the colonial power structure through the appointment 
system to the Executive and Legislative Councils. The representatives of the hongs got the 
rights in decision-making in the two councils. They also got the "first-hand information" 
about the government's plans/policies in advance. 
Moreover, it was profitable in intensifying the hongs' investments in HK both 
vertically and horizontally. Their businesses covered many aspects. Land has always been a 
rare resource in HK and the hongs owned many good locations (especially the prime areas in 
the Hong Kong Island). Since they had close relationships with the top bureaucrats, they 
easily earned the monopolies of businesses in various fields. Moreover, they controlled so 
many public utilities, banking and other services, they had larger voices in affecting the 
government policies (making more supportive measures for their business fields). 
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In sum, the selective interventionist role of the HK government in the economy was 
related with the colonial regime on the one hand, and the strategic relations among the 
government, the British hongs and the local Chinese industrialists on the other hand. 
Before the end of this thesis, I wish to clarify and compare several key concepts and 
models which relating with my arguments. 
In previous chapters, I have mentioned four forms of economic governance. 
Selective interventionism corjtkins two characteristics ~ (i) under a particular power 
network (or state-capital alliance), the government may selectively provide incentives to 
certain social sector or class; (ii) the economic governance / policies with political bias may 
not arouse social instability if the government can formulate a suitable strategy, and/or under 
a favourable social context (strategic equilibrium). 
Laissez-faire approach refers to - (i) it is assumed that the economy has an automatic 
corrective mechanism; (ii) the government should not interfere the private business activities; 
(iii) the government should provide the basic infrastructure，law and order, etc’ 
Positive non-interventionism refers to - (i) market failure is possible, and government 
should prevent it (by setting rules, regulations, constraints); (ii) government should "watch" 
and monitor the economy carefully; (iii) government does not intervene before careful 
calculation. 
Developmental statism refers to - (i) the major objective of the government is on 
development, especially in economic dimensions; (ii) "development" becomes the 
legitimating criteria of the government; (iii) the government is assumed to be neutral, and to 
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be above all interest groups; (iv) the economic interventions of the government in economy 
are all-arounded. 
In this thesis, I have argued that the case of Hong Kong should be categorised as selective 
interventionism. 
At last, I want to compare different policy orientations of government theoretically. 
In Poulantzas* theory, the government has to maintain a certain degree of autonomy (in 
•f 
setting policy agenda) from the ^  dominant class's interest consideration. This relative 
autonomy of the government can function as keeping the balance between political legitimacy 
and capital accumulation in the capitalist society. 
In Jessop's theory, the relative autonomy of the government is an empirical question. The 
governmental organizations can be understood as a strategically selective terrain which has 
asymmetrical effects on the organization of power in society. The direction of favourability of 
government policies and resources distribution plans depend on the changing balance of 
forces engaged in political actions both within and beyond the state. 
In my ISH Model, the relative autonomy of the government is related with the broader 
institutional setting. The present government structure and approved policies constraint the 
strategies of all interest groups. However, the relationship between the rational powerful 
agents and the government is dialectical, this relationship is also subject to historical 
contingencies. The relative autonomy of the government is an empirical question, it depends 
on institutional factors, agents' strategies, and contingency. Institutional bias may have 
unintended consequence which provides a "valve" for both the state managers and/or the 
societal actors. 
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After comparing different models, I hope the readers can notice the particularity of my ISH 
Model and the concept of selective interventionism. 
f -THE END-
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